IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecinqu/v51y2013i2p1324-1344.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How Health Insurance Affects Health Care Demand—A Structural Analysis Of Behavioral Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection

Author

Listed:
  • YINGYING DONG

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Yingying Dong, 2013. "How Health Insurance Affects Health Care Demand—A Structural Analysis Of Behavioral Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(2), pages 1324-1344, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:51:y:2013:i:2:p:1324-1344
    DOI: j.1465-7295.2012.00457.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00457.x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/j.1465-7295.2012.00457.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Michael, 1972. "On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(2), pages 223-255, March-Apr.
    2. Craig W. Perry & Harvey S. Rosen, 2001. "The Self-Employed Are Less Likely To Have Health Insurance Than Wage Earners: So What?," Working Papers 129, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    3. David Card & Carlos Dobkin & Nicole Maestas, 2008. "The Impact of Nearly Universal Insurance Coverage on Health Care Utilization: Evidence from Medicare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 2242-2258, December.
    4. Fry, Vanessa & Pashardes, Panos, 1994. "Abstention and Aggregation in Consumer Demand: Zero Tobacco Expenditures," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 502-518, July.
    5. Sandra L. Decker, 2005. "Medicare and the Health of Women with Breast Cancer," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 40(4), pages 948-968.
    6. Kenkel, Don, 1990. "Consumer Health Information and the Demand for Medical Care," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 72(4), pages 587-595, November.
    7. Becker, Gary S & Murphy, Kevin M, 1988. "A Theory of Rational Addiction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(4), pages 675-700, August.
    8. Keeler, Emmett B. & Rolph, John E., 1988. "The demand for episodes of treatment in the health insurance experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 337-367, December.
    9. Kim, Kyoo il, 2006. "Sample selection models with a common dummy endogenous regressor in simultaneous equations: A simple two-step estimation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 280-286, May.
    10. Denise Doiron & Glenn Jones & Elizabeth Savage, 2008. "Healthy, wealthy and insured? The role of self‐assessed health in the demand for private health insurance," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 317-334, March.
    11. Craig William Perry & Harvey S. Rosen, 2001. "The Self-Employed are Less Likely to Have Health Insurance Than Wage Earners. So What?," NBER Working Papers 8316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Dhaval Dave & Robert Kaestner, 2009. "Health insurance and ex ante moral hazard: evidence from Medicare," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 367-390, December.
    13. repec:pri:cepsud:71rosen is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, 2007. "Diabetes Treatments and Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(3), pages 519-538.
    15. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September.
    16. Hanming Fang & Michael P. Keane & Dan Silverman, 2008. "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 303-350, April.
    17. Zweifel, Peter & Manning, Willard G., 2000. "Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 409-459, Elsevier.
    18. Savage, Elizabeth & Wright, Donald J., 2003. "Moral hazard and adverse selection in Australian private hospitals: 1989-1990," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 331-359, May.
    19. Manning, Willard G. & Mullahy, John, 2001. "Estimating log models: to transform or not to transform?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 461-494, July.
    20. Steven T. Yen & Andrew M. Jones, 1996. "Individual cigarette consumption and addiction: A flexible limited dependent variable approach," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 5(2), pages 105-117, March.
    21. James J. Heckman, 1981. "Heterogeneity and State Dependence," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Labor Markets, pages 91-140, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Christophe Courbage & Augustin de Coulon, 2004. "Prevention and Private Health Insurance in the U.K," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 29(4), pages 719-727, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sengupta, Reshmi & Rooj, Debasis, 2019. "The effect of health insurance on hospitalization: Identification of adverse selection, moral hazard and the vulnerable population in the Indian healthcare market," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 110-129.
    2. Aistov, Andrey V. (Аистов, Андрей) & Aleksandrova, Ekaterina A. (Александрова, Екатерина), 2018. "Ex Post Moral Hazard in Private Health Insurance [Постконтрактный Оппортунизм На Рынке Добровольного Медицинского Страхования]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 3, pages 148-181, June.
    3. Lan Nguyen & Andrew C. Worthington, 2023. "Moral hazard in Australian private health insurance: the case of dental care services and extras cover," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 48(1), pages 157-176, January.
    4. Zhongda Li & Lu Liu & Jiayu Shi & Yubing Sui, 2021. "Health insurance, risk attitudes, and household financial behavior," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(5), pages 1239-1246, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrey Aistov & Ekaterina Aleksandrova & Christopher J. Gerry, 2021. "Voluntary private health insurance, health-related behaviours and health outcomes: evidence from Russia," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 22(2), pages 281-309, March.
    2. Rong Fu & Haruko Noguchi, 2019. "Moral hazard under zero price policy: evidence from Japanese long-term care claims data," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 20(6), pages 785-799, August.
    3. Dhaval Dave & Robert Kaestner, 2009. "Health insurance and ex ante moral hazard: evidence from Medicare," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 367-390, December.
    4. Laure B. de Preux, 2011. "Anticipatory ex ante moral hazard and the effect of medicare on prevention," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(9), pages 1056-1072, September.
    5. Yilma, Zelalem & van Kempen, Luuk & de Hoop, Thomas, 2012. "A perverse ‘net’ effect? Health insurance and ex-ante moral hazard in Ghana," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 138-147.
    6. Preety Srivastava & Gang Chen & Anthony Harris, 2017. "Oral Health, Dental Insurance and Dental Service use in Australia," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(1), pages 35-53, January.
    7. Hullegie, P.G.J., 2012. "Essays on health and labor economics," Other publications TiSEM dcc68fc9-7af1-4ba9-8f90-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Spenkuch, Jörg L., 2012. "Moral hazard and selection among the poor: Evidence from a randomized experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 72-85.
    9. Capatina, Elena, 2020. "Selection in employer sponsored health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    10. Wanyue Dong & Jianmin Gao & Zhongliang Zhou & Ruhai Bai & Yue Wu & Min Su & Chi Shen & Xin Lan & Xiao Wang, 2018. "Effects of China’s urban basic health insurance on preventive care service utilization and health behaviors: Evidence from the China Health and Nutrition Survey," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(12), pages 1-14, December.
    11. Sebastian Soika, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Advantageous Selection in Private Disability Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(1), pages 97-125, January.
    12. Karlsson, Martin & Klohn, Florian & Rickayzen, Ben, 2018. "The role of heterogeneous parameters for the detection of selection in insurance contracts," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 110-121.
    13. Doiron, Denise & Fiebig, Denzil G. & Suziedelyte, Agne, 2014. "Hips and hearts: The variation in incentive effects of insurance across hospital procedures," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 81-97.
    14. Kiil, Astrid, 2012. "What characterises the privately insured in universal health care systems? A review of the empirical evidence," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 60-75.
    15. Xiaoqi Zhang & Yi Chen & Yi Yao, 2021. "Dynamic information asymmetry in micro health insurance: implications for sustainability," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 46(3), pages 468-507, July.
    16. Meliyanni Johar & Glenn Jones & Michael Keane & Elizabeth Savage & Olena Stavrunova, 2011. "Waiting times for elective surgery and the decision to buy private health insurance," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(S1), pages 68-86, September.
    17. Patrick Hullegie & Tobias J. Klein, 2010. "The effect of private health insurance on medical care utilization and self‐assessed health in Germany," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(9), pages 1048-1062, September.
    18. Nathan Kettlewell, 2019. "Utilization and Selection in an Ancillaries Health Insurance Market," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 86(4), pages 989-1017, December.
    19. Mark Stabile & Sarah Thomson, 2014. "The Changing Role of Government in Financing Health Care: An International Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(2), pages 480-518, June.
    20. Rodolfo Nayga, 1999. "A Note on Schooling and Smoking: the issue revisited," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(3), pages 253-258.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:51:y:2013:i:2:p:1324-1344. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.