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Viewpoint: Canadian competition policy: progress and prospects

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  • Thomas W. Ross

Abstract

. This paper discusses the state of competition policy – in particular the economics of competition policy – in Canada today and considers its prospects going forward. It argues that: (i) the importance of competition policy has become accepted widely in Canada and indeed throughout much of the world; (ii) competition policy design and enforcement is in general well done in Canada; (iii) economists, including many Canadians, have played a central role in the development of an efficient and effective competition policy in Canada and elsewhere; and (iv) competition policy in Canada is today facing very serious challenges, and economists should be concerned. La politique de concurrence au Canada: progrès et prospective. Ce mémoire discute de l’état de la politique de concurrence – en particulier l’économie de la politique de concurrence – au Canada aujourd’hui et examine ce qui l’attend. On suggère que (i) l’importance de la politique de concurrence est devenue largement acceptée au Canada et dans le gros du reste du monde, (ii) le dessein et l’application de la politique de concurrence sont en général bien faits au Canada; (iii) les économistes, et plusieurs Canadiens parmi eux, ont joué un rôle central dans le développement d’une politique de concurrence efficace et effective au Canada et ailleurs; et (iv) la politique de concurrence au Canada fait face à des défis très sérieux ces temps‐ci et les économistes devraient s’en inquiéter.

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  • Thomas W. Ross, 2004. "Viewpoint: Canadian competition policy: progress and prospects," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(2), pages 243-268, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:37:y:2004:i:2:p:243-268
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.00001.x
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    3. Matt Kellison, 2004. "The McKinsey Global Institute Productivity Studies: Lessons for Canada," CSLS Research Reports 2004-10, Centre for the Study of Living Standards.

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