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PROTOCOL: Merit Pay Programs for Improving Teacher Retention, Teacher Satisfaction, and Student Achievement in Primary and Secondary Education: A Systematic Review

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  • Gary Ritter
  • Julie Trivitt
  • Leesa Foreman
  • Corey DeAngelis
  • George Denny

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  • Gary Ritter & Julie Trivitt & Leesa Foreman & Corey DeAngelis & George Denny, 2016. "PROTOCOL: Merit Pay Programs for Improving Teacher Retention, Teacher Satisfaction, and Student Achievement in Primary and Secondary Education: A Systematic Review," Campbell Systematic Reviews, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(1), pages 1-37.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:camsys:v:12:y:2016:i:1:p:1-37
    DOI: 10.1002/CL2.166
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:mpr:mprres:7407 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Figlio, David N. & Kenny, Lawrence W., 2007. "Individual teacher incentives and student performance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 901-914, June.
    3. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December.
    4. repec:mpr:mprres:6829 is not listed on IDEAS
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