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The Origins of Institutional Crises in Latin America

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  • Gretchen Helmke

Abstract

Institutional instability and interbranch crises pose a fundamental challenge to democracies in Latin America and the developing world more generally. Combining a standard game theoretic model of crisis bargaining with a unique dataset on courts, executives, and legislatures for 18 Latin American countries between 1985 and 2008, the article develops a strategic account of how interbranch crises emerge and evolve. In addition to providing the first systematic picture of the frequency, type, and location of interbranch crises for the region, the article demonstrates that the decision to initiate an interbranch crisis is influenced by the allocation of institutional powers, public support for the targeted branch, and the expectations of success based on recent experiences. Building on these results, the article identifies several novel directions for future research on institutional instability.

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  • Gretchen Helmke, 2010. "The Origins of Institutional Crises in Latin America," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 737-750, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:54:y:2010:i:3:p:737-750
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00457.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Llanos, Mariana & Tibi Weber, Cordula & Heyl, Charlotte & Stroh, Alexander, 2014. "Informal Interference in the Judiciary in New Democracies: A Comparison of Six African and Latin American Cases," GIGA Working Papers 245, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    2. James R. Rogers & Joseph Daniel Ura, 2020. "A majoritarian basis for judicial countermajoritarianism," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 435-459, July.
    3. Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson & Joseph Daniel Ura, 2013. "Public opinion and conflict in the separation of powers: Understanding the Honduran coup of 2009," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(1), pages 105-127, January.

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