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Public opinion and conflict in the separation of powers: Understanding the Honduran coup of 2009

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  • Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson

    (Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, USA)

  • Joseph Daniel Ura

    (Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, USA)

Abstract

Formal constitutional systems of separated powers often fail to sustain meaningful systems of checks and balances in presidential-style democracies. What conditions support balance in the separation of powers and what conditions provoke instability and conflict? We draw on Madisonian political theory and research addressing the separation of powers in the United States to develop a game theoretical model of inter-institutional stability and conflict within a separation of powers system. Two factors emerge as catalysts for institutional instability and conflict among the branches of government: high-stakes institutional rivalry combined with uncertainty about the public’s relative support for various branches of government. We apply the model to the experience of Honduras in 2008–2009 that resulted in the coup ousting President Zelaya which illustrates the difficulty of developing credible checks and balances.

Suggested Citation

  • Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson & Joseph Daniel Ura, 2013. "Public opinion and conflict in the separation of powers: Understanding the Honduran coup of 2009," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(1), pages 105-127, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:25:y:2013:i:1:p:105-127
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629812453216
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gretchen Helmke, 2010. "The Origins of Institutional Crises in Latin America," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 737-750, July.
    2. Tom S. Clark, 2009. "The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 971-989, October.
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