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Interest Group Competition and Coalition Formation

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  • Thomas T. Holyoke

Abstract

This article investigates how interest group competition, a state of conflicting policy preferences stemming from how organizational memberships are defined, can resolve into conflict or cooperation. The strategic choices of competing lobbyists are modeled as the results of a trade‐off between the need to represent members and please legislators, and the additional advocacy resources they hope to gain by agreeing to form coalitions with their competitors rather than fight them in resource‐draining conflicts. Hypotheses derived from the model are tested with data from interviews with lobbyists on six issues taken up by the U.S. Congress from 1999 to 2002. The results suggest that while group members do have some limited power to constrain the policy positions taken on issues by their lobbyists, it is primarily the pressures from legislators and competitor groups that push lobbyists into collectively supporting coalition positions different from those desired by their members.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas T. Holyoke, 2009. "Interest Group Competition and Coalition Formation," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 360-375, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:53:y:2009:i:2:p:360-375
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00375.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Martimort, David, 2019. ""When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making," CEPR Discussion Papers 13843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Marcel Hanegraaff & Andrea Pritoni, 2019. "United in fear: Interest group coalition formation as a weapon of the weak?," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 198-218, June.
    3. Matthew Lee Howell, 2014. "The Logic of Urban Fragmentation: Organisational Ecology and the Proliferation of American Cities," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 51(5), pages 899-916, April.
    4. Benjamin C. K. Egerod & Wiebke Marie Junk, 2022. "Competitive lobbying in the influence production process and the use of spatial econometrics in lobbying research," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 193-215, April.
    5. Kanol Direnç, 2015. "Social influence, competition and the act of lobbying," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 75-96, April.
    6. Sugandha Srivastav & Ryan Rafaty, 2023. "Political Strategies to Overcome Climate Policy Obstructionism," Papers 2304.14960, arXiv.org.

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