IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/vrs/reoecp/v19y2019i3p193-210n3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Democracy, Lobbying and Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Žák Milan

    (University of Economics and Management, Prague, Czech Republic)

Abstract

The paper deals with the issue of lobbying, defined as a democratic means of promoting interests. The text tries to find answers to the problems in the current economic theory. The basic links are defined by using a simple graphic model, which are further examined by the SWOT analysis. The result is the knowledge that the basic coordination mechanism is the market – the information market. The role of government lies above all in creating a favourable institutional environment that does not interfere with spontaneous market relations. However, there are certain situations that the government could or should regulate. These situations are described by three hypothetical scenarios – a society without lobbying, a society where lobbing exists, but it is not transparent, and a society where lobbing is transparent, leading to a final discussion of possible directions and ways of its regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Žák Milan, 2019. "Democracy, Lobbying and Economics," Review of Economic Perspectives, Sciendo, vol. 19(3), pages 193-210, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:reoecp:v:19:y:2019:i:3:p:193-210:n:3
    DOI: 10.2478/revecp-2019-0011
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2478/revecp-2019-0011
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2478/revecp-2019-0011?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Acocella,Nicola, 2005. "Economic Policy in the Age of Globalisation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521540384, September.
    2. Gordon C. Rausser & William E. Foster, 1990. "Political Preference Functions and Public Policy Reform," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 72(3), pages 641-652.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lee, David R. & Rausser, Gordon C., 1992. "The Structure of Research and Transfer Policies in International Agriculture: Evidence and Implications," 1992 Occasional Paper Series No. 6 197731, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Lyons, Robert F. & Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K., 1996. "Putty-clay politics in transition economies," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt0t30p88v, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    3. Marchant, Mary A. & Neff, Steven A. & Xiao, Mei, 1997. "Political Economy of United States and European Union Dairy Policy Choice," 1997 Occasional Paper Series No. 7 198045, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    4. de Gorter, Harry & Nielson, David J. & Rausser, Gordon C., 1990. "The political economy of productive and predatory policies: a case study from agriculture," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt0q9495xv, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    5. Bazelon, Coleman, 1991. "The Importance of Political Markets in Formulating Economic Policy Recommendations," 1991 Annual Meeting, August 4-7, Manhattan, Kansas 271217, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    6. Bullock, David S., 1991. "Are Government Transfers Efficient? Problems In Testing The Efficient Redistribution Hypothesis," 1991 Annual Meeting, August 4-7, Manhattan, Kansas 271368, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    7. Ames, Glenn C.W., 1992. "The Political Economy Of Agricultural Trade Negotiations On The Uruguay Round Of Mtn: Can The U.S. And European Community Reach An Acceptable Compromise In The Gatt?," Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 1-10, December.
    8. Brown, W., 2006. "The Influence of Product Markets on Industrial Relations," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0652, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    9. Daowei Zhang & David Laband, 2005. "From Senators to the President: Solve the lumber problem or else," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 393-410, June.
    10. Morrison, William G. & de Wit, Jaap, 2019. "US open skies agreements and unlevel playing fields," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 30-38.
    11. William Morrison, Jaap de Wit, 2017. "US Open Skies Agreements and Unlevel Playing Fields," LCERPA Working Papers 0104, Laurier Centre for Economic Research and Policy Analysis, revised 01 Aug 2017.
    12. Rausser, Gordon C., 1991. "Predatory versus productive government: the case of U.S. agricultural policies," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt21913950, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    13. Gordon C. Rausser, 1992. "Predatory versus Productive Government: The Case of U.S. Agricultural Policies," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 133-157, Summer.
    14. Andrzej Wojtyna, 2007. "Teoretyczny wymiar zależności między zmianami instytucjonalnymi, polityką ekonomiczną a wzrostem gospodarczym," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 5-6, pages 1-23.
    15. SHEA, Esther Y.P., 2010. "Understanding China's grain procurement policy from a perspective of optimization," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 639-649, December.
    16. Trofimov, Ivan D., 2017. "Political economy of trade protection and liberalization: in search of agency-based and holistic framework of policy change," MPRA Paper 79504, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Kym Anderson & Gordon Rausser & Johan Swinnen, 2013. "Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(2), pages 423-477, June.
    18. Giovanni Michelagnoli, 2015. "The Shaping of Incomes Policy in the Eighties. The Contribution of Ezio Tarantelli," HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2015(2), pages 37-56.
    19. Coggins, Jay S., 1994. "Implementing Agricultural Policy Virtually: The Case of Set-Aside," Staff Papers 200579, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    20. Smith, Vincent, 2017. "The US Federal Crop Insurance Program: A Case Study in Rent-Seeking," Working Papers 06899, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Impact of Lobbying on Democracy; Public Choice; New Institutional Economy; New Political Economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vrs:reoecp:v:19:y:2019:i:3:p:193-210:n:3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.sciendo.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.