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The Evaluation of the Role of the Office for Protection of Competition of the Czech Republic in Regulating Public Procurement

Author

Listed:
  • Plaček Michal

    (All: Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Smetanovo nábřeží 995/6, Prague, Czech Republic.)

  • Ochrana František

    (All: Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Smetanovo nábřeží 995/6, Prague, Czech Republic.)

  • Schmidt Martin

    (All: Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Smetanovo nábřeží 995/6, Prague, Czech Republic.)

  • Půček Milan

    (All: Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Smetanovo nábřeží 995/6, Prague, Czech Republic.)

Abstract

Our study offers additional insight into the Office for Protection of Competition. It examines the Office for Protection of Competition in terms of an input-process-output model, defines the inputs needed for its activities and examines the outputs of its control activities. It also identifies external factors (in the environment) that affect the performance and behavior of the Office for Protection of Competition and have an impact on inspection activities. The theoretical background as well as assumptions are then subjected to empirical scrutiny. Theoretical conclusions and recommendations for more effective control of public contracts are drawn from the conclusions which are established.

Suggested Citation

  • Plaček Michal & Ochrana František & Schmidt Martin & Půček Milan, 2016. "The Evaluation of the Role of the Office for Protection of Competition of the Czech Republic in Regulating Public Procurement," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 9(1), pages 97-116, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:njopap:v:9:y:2016:i:1:p:97-116:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/nispa-2016-0005
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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