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Permisos transables frente a la introducción de un combustible limpio: estudio de caso para PM-10 y NOx en Santiago, Chile

Author

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  • Raúl O'Ryan
  • Rodrigo Bravo

Abstract

A partir de 1990 se introdujo en Santiago un sistema de compensación de emisiones para controlar las emisiones de PM-10 de fuentes fijas, en principio equivalente a un sistema de permisos de emisión (EPS), instrumento económico subóptimo. Se buscaba con este sistema reducir los costos de cumplimiento e impedir el crecimiento de las emisiones de fuentes fijas al obligar a fuentes nuevas a compensar todas sus emisiones. El sistema básicamente no operó hasta 1997, año en que se introduce el gas natural en Santiago, combustible considerado limpio. En este contexto, este trabajo aborda las siguientes preguntas: ¿Qué impacto ha tenido la introducción del gas natural sobre la aplicabilidad de permisos transables para PM-10 y NOx? ¿Se siguen justificando las ganancias en eficiencia disminuyen a tal nivel que se puede considerar el uso de instrumentos de regulación directa? También se cuantifican las ganancias en eficiencia asociadas a aplicar un sistema de permisos ambientales (APS) que, a diferencia de un

Suggested Citation

  • Raúl O'Ryan & Rodrigo Bravo, 2001. "Permisos transables frente a la introducción de un combustible limpio: estudio de caso para PM-10 y NOx en Santiago, Chile," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 28(2 Year 20), pages 267-291, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:28:y:2001:i:2:p:267-291
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. O'Ryan, Raul E., 1996. "Cost-Effective Policies to Improve Urban Air Quality in Santiago, Chile," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 302-313, November.
    3. Ger Klaassen & Andries Nentjes, 1997. "Creating Markets for Air Pollution Control in Europe and the USA," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(2), pages 125-146, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mardones, Cristian & Cabello, Martin, 2019. "Effectiveness of local air pollution and GHG taxes: The case of Chilean industrial sources," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 491-500.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Natural Resource; pollution in air.;

    JEL classification:

    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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