IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v102y1994i1p76-102.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Short-Time Compensation: Job Security, and Employment Contracts: Evidence from Selected OECD Countries

Author

Listed:
  • Van Audenrode, Marc A

Abstract

In this paper, a model of optimal employment contracting describes differences across countries in firing restrictions and short-time compensation systems for workers forced to work shorter hours to avoid layoff. The model predicts that the existence of a short-time compensation system will generate major fluctuations in working hours only if the short-time compensation system is more generous than the traditional unemployment insurance system. A test performed for ten OECD countries shows that in countries with generous short-time compensation systems, the speed of adjustment of total hours worked is higher than in the United States, despite a much slower adjustment in the number of workers employed. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Van Audenrode, Marc A, 1994. "Short-Time Compensation: Job Security, and Employment Contracts: Evidence from Selected OECD Countries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(1), pages 76-102, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:102:y:1994:i:1:p:76-102
    DOI: 10.1086/261922
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261922
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. See http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE for details.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/261922?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George A. Akerlof & Hajime Miyazaki, 1980. "The Implicit Contract Theory of Unemployment meets the Wage Bill Argument," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(2), pages 321-338.
    2. Katharine G. Abraham & Susan N. Houseman, 1993. "Job Security and Work Force Adjustment: How Different are U.S. and Japanese Practices?," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers, in: Christopher F. Buechtemann (ed.),Employment Security and Labor Market Behavior: Interdisciplinary Approaches and International Evidence, pages 180-199, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    3. Burdett, Kenneth & Wright, Randall, 1989. "Unemployment Insurance and Short-Time Compensation: The Effects on Layoffs, Hours per Worker, and Wages," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1479-1496, December.
    4. Nadiri, M Ishaq & Rosen, Sherwin, 1969. "Interrelated Factor Demand Functions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 457-471, Part I Se.
    5. Feldstein, Martin S, 1976. "Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 937-957, October.
    6. F. P. R. Brechling, 1965. "The Relationship between Output and Employment in British Manufacturing Industries," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 32(3), pages 187-216.
    7. Edward P. Lazear, 1990. "Job Security Provisions and Employment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(3), pages 699-726.
    8. Samuel Bentolila & Giuseppe Bertola, 1990. "Firing Costs and Labour Demand: How Bad is Eurosclerosis?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 381-402.
    9. Topel, Robert H, 1982. "Inventories, Layoffs, and the Short-Run Demand for Labor," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 769-787, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Peter Kuhn, "undated". "Canada and the "OECD Hypothesis": Does Labour Market Inflexibility Explain Canada's High Level of Unemployment?," Canadian International Labour Network Working Papers 10, McMaster University.
    2. Pissarides, Christopher, 2002. "Consumption and savings with unemployment risk: implications for optimal employment contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 2211, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:789-848 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Noel Gaston, 1992. "A Characterization of Australian Unemployment Compensation: An Analysis of Labour Market Adjustment," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 68(3), pages 247-253, September.
    5. Fath Julia & Fuest Clemens, 2005. "Temporary Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance: Is Experience Rating Desirable?," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 6(4), pages 471-483, December.
    6. James J. Heckman & Carmen Pagés, 2004. "Introduction to "Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin American and the Caribbean"," NBER Chapters, in: Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean, pages 1-108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Tito Boeri & Jan van Ours, 2013. "The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets: Second Edition," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10142.
    8. Daniel S. Hamermesh, 1993. "Labor Demand and the Source of Adjustment Costs," NBER Working Papers 4394, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Gross, Dominique M. & Ryan, Michael, 2008. "FDI location and size: Does employment protection legislation matter?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 590-605, November.
    10. Huang, Li-Hsuan, 2001. "Was higher education a quasi-fixed factor for firms in the 1980s?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 495-501, October.
    11. Andrew Garin & Filipe Silverio, 2017. "How Does Firm Performance Affect Wages? Evidence from Idiosyncratic Export Shocks," 2017 Papers pga940, Job Market Papers.
    12. Kawai, Eizo, 2001. "Re-examination of wage, employment, and hours adjustments: what is crucial for differences in the adjustments?," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 483-497, December.
    13. Stephen Nickell, 1997. "Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 55-74, Summer.
    14. Kugler, Adriana, 2000. "The Incidence of Job Security Regulations on Labor Market Flexibility and Compliance in Colombia: Evidence from the 1990 Reform," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3267, Inter-American Development Bank.
    15. Claudio Montenegro & Carmen Pagés-Serra, 2003. "¿Quién se beneficia con la normativa de los mercados laborales?: Chile, 1960-1998," Research Department Publications 4346, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    16. Lars Ljungqvist, 2002. "How Do Lay--off Costs Affect Employment?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(482), pages 829-853, October.
    17. Kjell Erik Lommerud & Odd Rune Straume, 2012. "Employment Protection Versus Flexicurity: On Technology Adoption in Unionised Firms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(1), pages 177-199, March.
    18. Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, 2001. "Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 915-957, October.
    19. Carmen Pagés-Serra, 2000. "The Cost of Job Security Regulation: Evidence from Latin American Labor Markets," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2000), pages 109-154, August.
    20. Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2019. "Paid to Quit," De Economist, Springer, vol. 167(4), pages 387-406, December.
    21. Goerke, Laszlo & Neugart, Michael, 2015. "Lobbying and dismissal dispute resolution systems," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 50-62.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:102:y:1994:i:1:p:76-102. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.