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Sanctions by Social Norms and the Law: Substitutes or Complements?

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  • Yoshinobu Zasu

Abstract

This paper deals with the interaction between informal sanctions imposed by social norms and formal sanctions authorized by law. While some scholars claim that the formal rule merely substitutes for the informal rule, other authors argue that formal and informal rules are complementary. If the former view is correct, we do not need the costly formal rules. If the latter view is correct, the joint use of the formal rule by the government and the informal rule by the local community would provide more efficient outcomes than the use of the informal rule in isolation. The purpose of this paper is to show whether these two rules are substitutes or complements.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoshinobu Zasu, 2007. "Sanctions by Social Norms and the Law: Substitutes or Complements?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 379-396, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:36:y:2007:p:379-396
    DOI: 10.1086/511896
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    3. Pedro Naso & Erwin Bulte & Tim Swanson, 2017. "Can there be benefits from competing legal regimes? The impact of legal pluralism in post-conflict Sierra Leone," CIES Research Paper series 56-2017, Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute.
    4. Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska & Jacek Lewkowicz, 2021. "Post-socialist “illiberal democracies”: do de jure constitutional rights matter?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 233-265, June.
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    6. Jacek LEWKOWICZ & Katarzyna METELSKA-SZANIAWSKA, 2021. "De Jure and De Facto Institutions: Implications for Law and for Economics," Ekonomista, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, issue 6, pages 758-776.
    7. Mungan, Murat C., 2016. "A generalized model for reputational sanctions and the (ir)relevance of the interactions between legal and reputational sanctions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 86-92.
    8. Bruno Deffains & Claude Fluet, 2013. "Legal Liability when Individuals Have Moral Concerns," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(4), pages 930-955, August.
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    10. Bruno Deffains & Claude Fluet, 2013. "The Role of Social Image Concerns in the Design of Legal Regimes," Cahiers de recherche 1321, CIRPEE.
    11. Bruno Deffains & Claude Fluet, 2020. "Social Norms and Legal Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(1), pages 139-169.
    12. Faillo, Marco & Rizzolli, Matteo & Tontrup, Stephan, 2019. "Thou shalt not steal: Taking aversion with legal property claims," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 88-101.
    13. Christoph Engel & Klaus Heine & Shaheen Naseer, 2021. "Religion and Tradition in Conflict Experimentally Testing the Power of Social Norms to Invalidate Religious Law," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2021_13, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    14. Tatiana Iwai, 2016. "The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracts in the Decision of Cooperation of the Agents," Brazilian Business Review, Fucape Business School, vol. 13(1), pages 47-68, January.
    15. Naso, Pedro & Bulte, Erwin & Swanson, Tim, 2020. "Legal pluralism in post-conflict Sierra Leone," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    16. Tsuneki Atsushi & Zasu Yoshinobu, 2015. "On the Complementarity between Law and Social Norms," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 503-512, November.
    17. Jacek Lewkowicz & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, 2016. "De jure and de facto institutions – disentangling the interrelationships," Working Papers 2016-29, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    18. Iwasaki Masaki, 2022. "Segmentation of Social Norms and Emergence of Social Conflicts Through COVID-19 Laws," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-36, April.
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    20. Larcom Shaun, 2013. "Accounting for Legal Pluralism: The Impact of Pre-colonial Institutions on Crime," The Law and Development Review, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 25-59, November.

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