IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/doi10.1086-669715.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Framing Punishment: Incarceration, Recommended Sentences, and Recidivism

Author

Listed:
  • Shawn D. Bushway
  • Emily G. Owens

Abstract

No consensus has emerged about how, or even if, incarceration affects the behavior of convicted offenders. One unexplored mechanism involves the possibility that the disutility of punishment is affected by both the actual punishment an offender receives and the sentence that he thinks could have been given, a psychological effect known as framing. We test for framing effects in punishment by exploiting a legal change in Maryland that altered recommended, but not actual, sentences for a subset of offenders. Using an individual-level data set of convictions, incarceration, and arrests, we find that longer recommended sentences are associated with higher rates of recidivism, conditional on actual punishment. Our results suggest that large discrepancies between the "bark" and "bite" of the criminal justice system may make incarceration less effective at reducing crime.

Suggested Citation

  • Shawn D. Bushway & Emily G. Owens, 2013. "Framing Punishment: Incarceration, Recommended Sentences, and Recidivism," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(2), pages 301-331.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/669715
    DOI: 10.1086/669715
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/669715
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/669715
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/669715?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lawrence Katz & Steven D. Levitt & Ellen Shustorovich, 2003. "Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 5(2), pages 318-343, August.
    2. Jeffrey R. Kling, 2006. "Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 863-876, June.
    3. Botond Kőszegi & Matthew Rabin, 2006. "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(4), pages 1133-1165.
    4. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 1-48.
    5. Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson & David Pozen, 2009. "Building Criminal Capital behind Bars: Peer Effects in Juvenile Corrections," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 105-147.
    6. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2008. "Contracts as reference points � experimental evidence," IEW - Working Papers 393, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    7. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2011. "Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 493-525, April.
    8. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Steven D. Levitt, 1996. "The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(2), pages 319-351.
    10. Francesco Drago & Roberto Galbiati & Pietro Vertova, 2009. "The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(2), pages 257-280, April.
    11. Stefano DellaVigna, 2009. "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 315-372, June.
    12. Alexandre Mas, 2006. "Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(3), pages 783-821.
    13. Ilyana Kuziemko, 2007. "Going Off Parole: How the Elimination of Discretionary Prison Release Affects the Social Cost of Crime," NBER Working Papers 13380, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Emily G. Owens, 2009. "More Time, Less Crime? Estimating the Incapacitative Effect of Sentence Enhancements," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(3), pages 551-579, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Mastrobuoni & Daniele Terlizzese, 2021. "Cash: Leave the Door Open? Prison Conditions and Recidivism," EIEF Working Papers Series 2111, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Jun 2021.
    2. Beau Kilmer & Greg Midgette, 2020. "Criminal Deterrence: Evidence from an Individual‐Level Analysis of 24/7 Sobriety," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(3), pages 801-834, June.
    3. Rossmo, D. Kim & Summers, Lucia, 2022. "Uncertainty and heuristics in offender decision-making: Deviations from rational choice," Journal of Criminal Justice, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    4. Ramos Maqueda,Manuel & Chen,Daniel Li, 2021. "The Role of Justice in Development : The Data Revolution," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9720, The World Bank.
    5. Laura Jaitman, 2019. "Frontiers in the economics of crime: lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean," Latin American Economic Review, Springer;Centro de Investigaciòn y Docencia Económica (CIDE), vol. 28(1), pages 1-36, December.
    6. Aurélie Ouss & Arnaud Philippe, 2024. "Inflation pénale et décisions de justice," Institut des Politiques Publiques halshs-04439196, HAL.
    7. Shoham Choshen‐Hillel & Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, 2022. "Framing negligence," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 19(2), pages 296-339, June.
    8. Maennig, Wolfgang & Wilhelm, Stefan, 2023. "News and noise in crime politics: The role of announcements and risk attitudes," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. McCrary, Justin & Lee, David S., 2009. "The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt2gh1r30h, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    2. Marco Fongoni, 2018. "Workers' reciprocity and the (ir)relevance of wage cyclicality for the volatility of job creation," Working Papers 1809, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
    3. Alex Markle & George Wu & Rebecca White & Aaron Sackett, 2018. "Goals as reference points in marathon running: A novel test of reference dependence," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 19-50, February.
    4. O’Flaherty, Brendan & Sethi, Rajiv, 2015. "Urban Crime," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 1519-1621, Elsevier.
    5. Björn Bartling & Leif Brandes & Daniel Schunk, 2015. "Expectations as Reference Points: Field Evidence from Professional Soccer," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(11), pages 2646-2661, November.
    6. Marco Fongoni & Alex Dickson, 2015. "A theory of wage setting behavior," Working Papers 1505, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2016.
    7. Roberto Galbiati & Arnaud Philippe, 2014. "3. Enfermez-les tous ! Dissuasion et effets pervers des politiques répressives," Regards croisés sur l'économie, La Découverte, vol. 0(1), pages 44-57.
    8. David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, 2009. "The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 1171, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    9. Alberto Alesina & Francesco Passarelli, 2019. "Loss Aversion in Politics," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(4), pages 936-947, October.
    10. Katharina Dowling & Daniel Guhl & Daniel Klapper & Martin Spann & Lucas Stich & Narine Yegoryan, 2020. "Behavioral biases in marketing," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 449-477, May.
    11. Hong, Fuhai & Hossain, Tanjim & List, John A., 2015. "Framing manipulations in contests: A natural field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 372-382.
    12. David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, 2009. "The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 1168, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    13. Francesco Drago & Roberto Galbiati, 2014. "Deterrent Effect of Imprisonment," Post-Print hal-03259811, HAL.
    14. Aleksandra GregoriÄ & SaÅ¡o Polanec & Sergeja SlapniÄ ar, 2010. "Pay me Right: Reference Values and Executive Compensation," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 16(5), pages 778-804, November.
    15. González-Jiménez, Víctor, 2024. "Incentive design for reference-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 493-518.
    16. Francesco Drago & Roberto Galbiati, 2012. "Indirect Effects of a Policy Altering Criminal Behavior: Evidence from the Italian Prison Experiment," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 199-218, April.
    17. Dickson, Alex & Fongoni, Marco, 2019. "Asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity, downward wage rigidity, and the employment contract," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 409-429.
    18. Fabian Herweg & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2015. "Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(1), pages 297-332.
    19. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2011. "Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 493-525, April.
    20. David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, 2009. "The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 1168, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/669715. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.