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Inflation pénale et décisions de justice

Author

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  • Aurélie Ouss

    (University of Pennsylvania)

  • Arnaud Philippe

    (University of Bristol [Bristol])

Abstract

Présentation Cette note explore l'effet des politiques pénales sur les décisions de justice et sur la récidive. Elle part de deux constats. Premièrement, il y a un écart considérable entre les peines maximales établies par le code pénal et les sanctions effectivement prononcées par les juridictions. Deuxièmement, il y a eu de nombreuses réformes modifiant les sanctions prévues par le code pénal, la plupart accentuant leur rigueur. Ces réformes influencent-elles les pratiques pénales ? Les auteurs montrent que la grande majorité des changements ciblent des délits rarement ou jamais utilisés et n'ont donc aucun effet sur les verdicts. Par ailleurs, les réformes ciblant des crimes et délits plus fréquemment utilisés n'influencent en pratique pas les décisions de justice. Il y a donc un décalage croissant entre le code pénal et les pratiques pénales, contribuant à une impression de laxisme du système judiciaire. Deux options existent pour réduire cet écart : diminuer les peines maximales prévues, ou augmenter les peines effectives pour les rapprocher du maximum. Nous montrons que la seconde option aurait pour effet d'augmenter considérablement le taux d'incarcération et le coût pour les finances publiques de la justice pénale. Résultats clés Les peines prononcées pour des délits représentent en moyenne 8%du maximum prévu par le code pénal, contre 45% pour les crimes. Les multiples réformes du code pénal, bien qu'elles augmentent les peines potentielles, n'ont pas d'impact sur les décisions de justice. Cela ne fait qu'accroître l'écart conséquent entre les peines possibles et celles effectivement prononcées, posant un problème de compréhension de la loi et de dissuasion. Réduire cet écart en augmentant les peines prononcées aboutirait à des taux d'incarcération extraordinairement élevés, même en faisant l'hypothèse d'effets dissuasifs importants Outre les conséquences sociales d'un tel changement, il impliquerait des dépenses intenables pour les finances publiques : le budget courant de l'administration pénitentiaire devrait augmenter d'au moins 12 milliards d'euros, et l'investissement nécessaire atteindrait entre 60 et 100 milliards d'euros.

Suggested Citation

  • Aurélie Ouss & Arnaud Philippe, 2024. "Inflation pénale et décisions de justice," Institut des Politiques Publiques halshs-04439196, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:ipppap:halshs-04439196
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04439196
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    References listed on IDEAS

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