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Employment Relations in Dual Labor Markets (" It's Nice Work If You Can Get It")

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  • Oi, Walter Y

Abstract

Jobs in big firms command higher wages. The author examines four theories that could explain this relation. First, large firms incur higher fixed employment costs including more specific training. Second, monitoring costs are greater in big firms and can be spread by hiring more productive workers. Third, large firms may choose to pay efficiency wages to deter shirking. Finally, large employers organize production around teams and pay higher wages to get workers who comply with the discipline of team production. The dispersion of wages and working conditions in the U.S. labor market reflect the heterogeneity of jobs (employment relations) and individuals. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Oi, Walter Y, 1990. "Employment Relations in Dual Labor Markets (" It's Nice Work If You Can Get It")," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(1), pages 124-149, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:8:y:1990:i:1:p:s124-49
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bils Marks & Chang Yongsung, 2001. "Cyclical Movements in Hours and Effort Under Sticky Wages-super-," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 1-26, June.
    2. Rayton, Bruce A., 2003. "The residual claim of rank and file employees," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 129-148, January.
    3. Yongsung Chang & Mark Bils, 2002. "Cyclical Movements in Hours and Effort under Sticky Wages," Macroeconomics 0204004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Ana Paula MARTINS, 2014. "The Mechanics of Dualistic Models: "Comparable" Structures and Comparative Statics Results," Journal of Economics and Political Economy, KSP Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 150-185, December.
    5. Adamchik, V.A. & Bedi, A.S., 2001. "Persistence of the gender pay differential in a transition economy," ISS Working Papers - General Series 19091, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    6. Jae Eun Lee & Rosemary Batt & Lisa M. Moynihan, 2019. "Strategic Dilemmas: How Managers Use HR Practices to Meet Multiple Goals," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 57(3), pages 513-539, September.
    7. Bruce Rayton, 1997. "Rent-sharing or incentives? Estimating the residual claim of average employees," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(12), pages 725-728.
    8. Idson, Todd L., 1995. "Team production effects on earnings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 197-203, August.
    9. Arnaud Lefranc & Fumiaki Ojima & Takashi Yoshida, 2014. "Intergenerational earnings mobility in Japan among sons and daughters: levels and trends," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 91-134, January.
    10. Mark Bils & Yongsung Chang, 1999. "Wages and the Allocation of Hours and Effort," NBER Working Papers 7309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Kertesi, Gábor & Köllő, János, 2003. "Ágazati bérkülönbségek Magyarországon, II. rész. Járadékokon való osztozkodás koncentrált ágazatokban, szakszervezeti aktivitás jelenlétében [Pay differentials between industries in Hungary, II. Re," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1049-1074.
    12. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2165-2214 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Kertesi, Gábor & Köllő, János, 2003. "Ágazati bérkülönbségek Magyarországon, I. rész. Az ágazati járadékképződés alternatív modelljei [Pay differentials between industries in Hungary. I. The basic models]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 923-938.
    14. Bils, Mark & Chang, Yongsung, 2003. "Welfare costs of sticky wages when effort can respond," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 311-330, March.
    15. Bradley T. Ewing & James E. Payne, 1999. "The Trade‐Off Between Supervision and Wages: Evidence of Efficiency Wages from the NLSY," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(2), pages 424-432, October.
    16. Harry Krashinsky, 2002. "Evidence on Adverse Selection and Establishment Size in the Labor Market," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 56(1), pages 84-96, October.

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