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Testing, Teacher Turnover, and the Distribution of Teachers Across Grades and Schools

Author

Listed:
  • Dillon Fuchsman

    (Sinquefield Center for Applied Economic Research Saint Louis University Saint Louis, MO 63108)

  • Tim R. Sass

    (Department of Economics Georgia State University Atlanta, GA 30303)

  • Gema Zamarro

    (Department of Education Reform University of Arkansas Fayetteville, AR 72701)

Abstract

Teacher turnover has adverse consequences for student achievement and imposes large financial costs for schools. Some have argued that high-stakes testing may lower teachers’ satisfaction with their jobs and could be a major contributor to teacher attrition. In this paper, we exploit changes in the tested grades and subjects in Georgia to study the effects of eliminating high-stakes testing on teacher turnover and the distribution of teachers across grades and schools. To measure the effect of testing pressures on teacher mobility choices we use a difference-in-differences approach, comparing changes in mobility over time in grades/subjects that discontinue testing vis-à-vis grades/subjects that are always tested. Our results show that eliminating testing did not have an impact on the likelihood of leaving teaching, moving between districts, changing schools within a district, or changing grades. Our findings hold for all teachers as well as for the subsample of early career teachers.

Suggested Citation

  • Dillon Fuchsman & Tim R. Sass & Gema Zamarro, 2023. "Testing, Teacher Turnover, and the Distribution of Teachers Across Grades and Schools," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 18(4), pages 654-675, Fall.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:edfpol:v:18:y:2023:i:4:p:654-675
    DOI: 10.1162/edfp_a_00376
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sarah C. Fuller & Helen F. Ladd, 2013. "School-Based Accountability and the Distribution of Teacher Quality Across Grades in Elementary School," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 8(4), pages 528-559, October.
    2. Feng, Li & Figlio, David & Sass, Tim, 2018. "School accountability and teacher mobility," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-17.
    3. Charles T. Clotfelter & Helen F. Ladd & Jacob L. Vigdor & Roger Aliaga Diaz, 2004. "Do school accountability systems make it more difficult for low-performing schools to attract and retain high-quality teachers?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(2), pages 251-271.
    4. Li Feng & Tim R. Sass, 2017. "Teacher Quality and Teacher Mobility," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 12(3), pages 396-418, Summer.
    5. Rebecca Dizon-Ross, 2018. "How Does School Accountability Affect Teachers? Evidence from New York City," NBER Working Papers 24658, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General

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