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Censorship as optimal persuasion

Author

Listed:
  • Kolotilin, Anton

    (School of Economics, UNSW Sydney)

  • Mylovanov, Timofiy

    (Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh)

  • Zapechelnyuk, Andriy

    (School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews)

Abstract

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's marginal utility is quasi-concave. Moreover, we show that it is optimal to reveal less information if the sender becomes more risk averse or the sender's utility shifts to the left. Finally, we apply our results to the problem of media censorship by a government.

Suggested Citation

  • Kolotilin, Anton & Mylovanov, Timofiy & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2022. "Censorship as optimal persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:4071
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Timothy Besley & Andrea Prat, 2006. "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 720-736, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian persuasion; information design; censorship; media;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

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