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The Price of Media Capture and the Looting of Newspapers in Interwar France

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  • Flandreau, Marc
  • Bignon, Vincent

Abstract

This paper develops a new insight enabling the empirical study of media capture: minority shareholders of newspapers and readers face similar risks. Both are adversely affected when corrupt insiders use the newspaper for personal profit and receive invisible revenues. This means that relevant data on influence and exploitation of newspaper has been hiding in plain sight in stock exchange or over-the-counter prices, since stock transactions reflect the value of this capture. Empirical data is consistent with increasing levels of looting in France during the 1930s. We provide a comparison with Britain and argue that Britain managed to protect its newspapers better.

Suggested Citation

  • Flandreau, Marc & Bignon, Vincent, 2012. "The Price of Media Capture and the Looting of Newspapers in Interwar France," CEPR Discussion Papers 9014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9014
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    3. Bignon, Vincent & Flandreau, Marc, 2011. "The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France Before World War I," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 616-653, September.
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    9. Timothy Besley & Andrea Prat, 2006. "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 720-736, June.
    10. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Market for News," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1031-1053, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bakker, Gerben, 2014. "How they made news pay: news traders’ quest for crisis-resistant business models," Economic History Working Papers 59304, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Control premium; Corruption; France; Governance; Interwar; Media; Minority shareholders;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-
    • N74 - Economic History - - Economic History: Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, and Other Services - - - Europe: 1913-

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