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Why do developing countries resist global trade agreements?

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  • Stephen Devadoss

Abstract

Although the Doha Development Round was launched with much promise for developing countries in 2001, the global trade negotiations have collapsed. One of the reasons for the lack of progress in the negotiation is the developed countries' unwillingness to reduce their enormous farm domestic subsidies and massive agricultural trade distortions. The developing countries' economies are characterized by heavy dependence on farm sector, labor-intensive agriculture, and persistent unemployment. Consequently, rich nations' unfair agricultural policies are detrimental to the well-being of poor exporting countries. This study develops a model incorporating developed countries' domestic and trade policies and developing countries' economic characteristics to illustrate the adverse effects of rich countries' policies on poor countries. We show that elimination of developed countries' policies will increase the world prices of agricultural commodities, which will benefit the farm-dependent developing countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Devadoss, 2006. "Why do developing countries resist global trade agreements?," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 191-208.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:jitecd:v:15:y:2006:i:2:p:191-208
    DOI: 10.1080/09638190600690895
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Huff, Karen, 2000. "Developing Country Concerns And Multilateral Trade Negotiations," CATRN Papers 12892, Canadian Agri-Food Trade Research Network.
    2. Josh Ederington, 2001. "International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1580-1593, December.
    3. Tim Josling, 2003. "Key Issues in the World Trade Organization Negotiations on Agriculture," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 85(3), pages 663-667.
    4. Batra, Raveendra N. & Seth, Avinash C., 1977. "Unemployment, tariffs and the theory of international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 295-306, August.
    5. Richard R. Barichello & Alex McCalla & Alberto Valdes, 2003. "Developing Countries and the World Trade Organization Negotiations," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 85(3), pages 674-678.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sébastien Mary, 2019. "Hungry for free trade? Food trade and extreme hunger in developing countries," Food Security: The Science, Sociology and Economics of Food Production and Access to Food, Springer;The International Society for Plant Pathology, vol. 11(2), pages 461-477, April.
    2. Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin, 2019. "Trade Liberalization: Is It Desirable for All Developing Economies?: A Literature Review," Research in World Economy, Research in World Economy, Sciedu Press, vol. 10(3), pages 199-204, December.
    3. May, Daniel E., 2011. "Incentives of small countries to participate in a global free trade agreement in agriculture: a theoretical analysis," Economia Agraria y Recursos Naturales, Spanish Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 15.
    4. Devadoss, Stephen & Ugwuanyi, Blessing & Ridley, William, 2022. "Determinants of Global Agricultural Trade," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 47(3), September.
    5. May, Daniel E., 2011. "Bilateralism in Agriculture when Countries use Distorting Domestic Policies," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 114657, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    6. May, Daniel E., 2011. "Incentives of small countries to participate in a global free trade agreement in agriculture: a theoretical analysis," Economi­a Agraria (Revista Economia Agraria), Agrarian Economist Association (AEA), Chile, vol. 15, pages 1-7.

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