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Problems with the Enforcement of Copyright Law: Is there a Social Norm Backlash?

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  • Ben Depoorter
  • Francesco Parisi
  • Sven Vanneste

Abstract

As a result of technological changes, copyright norms have developed in opposition to existing copyright law. In this article we examine how copyright enforcement efforts, mainly lawsuits against private copying, may induce further copyright disobedience by reinforcing the moral and social beliefs against conventional copyright law. In this paper we review recent theoretical and empirical studies and assess the hypothesis of countervailing copyright norm effects from copyright enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi & Sven Vanneste, 2005. "Problems with the Enforcement of Copyright Law: Is there a Social Norm Backlash?," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 361-369.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:12:y:2005:i:3:p:361-369
    DOI: 10.1080/13571510500300264
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Aaron Baird & Chadwick J. Miller & T. S. Raghu & Rajiv K. Sinha, 2016. "Product Line Extension in Consumer Software Markets in the Presence of Free Alternatives," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 27(2), pages 282-301, June.
    2. Domenico Sardanelli & Agostino Vollero & Alfonso Siano & Gianmaria Bottoni, 2019. "Lowering the pirate flag: a TPB study of the factors influencing the intention to pay for movie streaming services," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 549-574, September.
    3. Cox, Joe & Collins, Alan & Drinkwater, Stephen, 2010. "Seeders, leechers and social norms: Evidence from the market for illicit digital downloading," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 299-305, December.
    4. T. S. Raghu & Rajiv Sinha & Ajay Vinze & Orneita Burton, 2009. "Willingness to Pay in an Open Source Software Environment," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 20(2), pages 218-236, June.

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