Collective action, governance structure and organizational trust in localized systems of production. The case of the AOC organization of small producers

The objective of this paper is to explore the collective organizational forms that prevail in localized systems of production. More precisely, in a study on the governance of groups of small agricultural producers, we found that a club-based organization with a strong internal governance structure presents great advantages. Collective action, contractual relations and organizational trust are important in this governance system. This paper contributes to the discussion on Appellation d’Origine Contrôlées (AOCs, Designation of Controlled Origin) and more particularly provides new elements that help to understand the forms of collective organization that prevail in these systems. The amount of research dedicated to AOCs has increased so much that it is no longer legitimate to claim that they are just an obsolete form of local production with no future, or a harking back to the past. Yet, they are still often considered as curiosities, and few studies in the field of economic organization have focused on the organizational methods that prevail in these localized groups of producers. Basing ourselves on a specific example -- that of the Comté AOC -- economic arguments are presented in terms of legitimacy. It is shown (1) that it is possible to analyse the methods of internal organization of an AOC, and (2) that this analysis should be centred on a common good -- reputation -- that justifies and requires this form of co-ordination and brings into play mechanisms of organizational trust.