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Book Review

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  • Tong Li

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  • Tong Li, 2009. "Book Review," Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(4), pages 388-392.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:emetrv:v:28:y:2009:i:4:p:388-392
    DOI: 10.1080/07474930802459073
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
    2. Elena Krasnokutskaya, 2004. "Identification and Estimation in Highway Procurement Auctions under Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
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