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Steuerehrlichkeit und Steuerlotterien
[Compliance and Receipt Lotteries]

Author

Listed:
  • Philipp Krug

    (Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt)

  • Dominika Langenmayr

    (Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt)

  • Niklas Rauhut

    (Deutsche Berufsschule Hong Kong)

  • Finn Ole Schmude

    (Deutsche Berufsschule Hong Kong)

  • Thea Seitz

    (Deutsche Berufsschule Hong Kong)

  • Douglas Strasoldo

    (Deutsche Berufsschule Hong Kong)

  • Moritz Withoeft

    (Deutsche Berufsschule Hong Kong)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Für die Einnahmenseite der Staatsfinanzen ist nicht die aggregierte rechnerische Steuerschuld ausschlaggebend, sondern das tatsächliche Steueraufkommen. Diese beiden Größen fallen durch die „Steuerlücke“ auseinander, die das Ausmaß an Steuerhinterziehung beschreibt. Insbesondere bei der Umsatzsteuer reduziert mangelnde Steuerehrlichkeit das Steueraufkommen vieler Staaten. Während in Deutschland z. B. die Registrierkassenpflicht und die Kassenbonpflicht als Maßnahmen eingeführt wurden, setzen andere Staaten auch auf Steuerlotterien. Solche Lotterien werden diskutiert und konkrete Ausgestaltungsvorschläge gemacht, die mithilfe moderner Technologien auch einen positiven Effekt auf die Steuermoral haben können. Das zugrundeliegende Konzept wurde von Schüler:innen der Deutschen Berufsschule Hong Kong für den Schülerwettbewerb YES! Young Economic Summit entwickelt.

Suggested Citation

  • Philipp Krug & Dominika Langenmayr & Niklas Rauhut & Finn Ole Schmude & Thea Seitz & Douglas Strasoldo & Moritz Withoeft, 2021. "Steuerehrlichkeit und Steuerlotterien [Compliance and Receipt Lotteries]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 101(12), pages 953-955, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:101:y:2021:i:12:d:10.1007_s10273-021-3072-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-021-3072-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Philipp Doerrenberg & Andreas Peichl, 2022. "Tax Morale and the Role of Social Norms and Reciprocity - Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 78(1-2), pages 44-86.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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