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Organization and economic behavior: An interpretation of recent findings

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  • Martin Spechler

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  • Martin Spechler, 1982. "Organization and economic behavior: An interpretation of recent findings," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 118(2), pages 366-380, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:weltar:v:118:y:1982:i:2:p:366-380
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02706193
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    1. repec:bla:econom:v:40:y:1973:i:158:p:155-73 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Roberts, Blaine, 1973. "An Extension of Optimality Criteria: An Axiomatic Approach to Institutional Choice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 386-400, Part I, M.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. Henry Ogden Armour & David J. Teece, 1978. "Organizational Structure and Economic Performance: A Test of the Multidivisional Hypothesis," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 106-122, Spring.
    5. Paul A. Samuelson, 1956. "Social Indifference Curves," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 70(1), pages 1-22.
    6. Gaskins, Darius Jr., 1971. "Dynamic limit pricing: Optimal pricing under threat of entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 306-322, September.
    7. McKean, John R & Kania, John J, 1978. "An Industry Approach to Owner-Manager Control and Profit Performance," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(2), pages 327-342, April.
    8. James A. Mirrlees, 1976. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring.
    9. Shipley, David D, 1981. "Pricing Objectives in British Manufacturing Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 429-443, June.
    10. Shorey Peterson, 1965. "Corporate Control and Capitalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 79(1), pages 1-24.
    11. Leland, Hayne E, 1972. "The Dynamics of a Revenue Maximizing Firm," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(2), pages 376-385, June.
    12. Carl Kaysen, 1965. "Another View of Corporate Capitalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 79(1), pages 41-51.
    13. R. Joseph Monsen & John S. Chitj & David E. Cooley, 1968. "The Effect of Separation of Ownership and Control on the Performance of the Large Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 82(3), pages 435-451.
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