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A theoretical perspective on Islamic banking and financial intermediation

In: Risk and Regulation of Islamic Banking

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  • Mervyn K. Lewis

Abstract

From a single product offering in 1963, the Islamic financial services industry has grown to an estimated $1.6 trillion in assets. Products must comply with profit and risk-sharing criteria and regulations preventing banks from venturing into activities with high risk and excessive uncertainty. This timely volume analyses these matters and considers the range of new products, discussing both conceptual and practical dimensions. It connects Islamic finance to the mainstream theoretical literature on financial intermediation while also exploring its differences. The expert contributors also examine why an ethical foundation is important and why the system requires well-thought-out regulations to ensure outcomes that protect the community’s well-being.

Suggested Citation

  • Mervyn K. Lewis, 2014. "A theoretical perspective on Islamic banking and financial intermediation," Chapters, in: Mervyn K. Lewis & Mohamed Ariff & Shamsher Mohamad (ed.), Risk and Regulation of Islamic Banking, chapter 2, pages 11-42, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15843_2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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