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Probabilistic models of profiles for voting by evaluation

Author

Listed:
  • Antoine Rolland

    (ERIC EA 3083, Université de Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2)

  • Jean-Baptiste Aubin

    (Univ Lyon, INSA Lyon, UJM, UCBL, ECL, ICJ, UMR5208)

  • Irène Gannaz

    (Grenoble INP, G-SCOP, Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS)

  • Samuela Leoni

    (Univ Lyon, INSA Lyon, UJM, UCBL, ECL, ICJ, UMR5208)

Abstract

Considering voting rules based on evaluation inputs rather than preference rankings modifies the paradigm of probabilistic studies of voting procedures. This article proposes several simulation models for generating evaluation-based voting inputs. These models can cope with dependent and non identical marginal distributions of the evaluations received by the candidates. A last part is devoted to fitting these models to real data sets.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoine Rolland & Jean-Baptiste Aubin & Irène Gannaz & Samuela Leoni, 2024. "Probabilistic models of profiles for voting by evaluation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(2), pages 377-400, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:63:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-024-01535-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01535-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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