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When is Voting Optimal?

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  • Ruth Ben-Yashar
  • Leif Danziger

Abstract

We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers’ posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper sheds light on the relationship between the optimal decision rule and voting mechanisms. The paper derives the conditions under which the optimal decision rule is equivalent to some well-known voting procedure (weighted supermajority, weighted majority, and simple majority) and shows that these are very stringent. The paper also considers more general voting procedures, as for example allowing for abstentions, and shows that the conditions for reaching the optimal collective choice remain very stringent.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruth Ben-Yashar & Leif Danziger, 2014. "When is Voting Optimal?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5116, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5116
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    Cited by:

    1. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Miriam Krausz & Shmuel Nitzan, 2018. "The effect of democratic decision-making on investment in reputation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 155-164, October.
    2. BAHARAD, Eyal & BEN-YASHAR, Ruth & NITZAN, Shmuel, 2018. "Variable Competence and Collective Performance: Unanimity vs. Simple Majority Rule," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-80, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    3. Eyal Baharad & Ruth Ben-Yashar & Shmuel Nitzan, 2020. "Variable Competence and Collective Performance: Unanimity Versus Simple Majority Rule," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 157-167, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting rule; common goal; collective choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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