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Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments

Author

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  • Christian Saile

    (Technical University of Munich)

  • Warut Suksompong

    (University of Oxford)

Abstract

Tournament solutions provide methods for selecting the “best” alternatives from a tournament and have found applications in a wide range of areas. Previous work has shown that several well-known tournament solutions almost never rule out any alternative in large random tournaments. Nevertheless, all analytical results thus far have assumed a rigid probabilistic model, in which either a tournament is chosen uniformly at random, or there is a linear order of alternatives and the orientation of all edges in the tournament is chosen with the same probabilities according to the linear order. In this work, we consider a significantly more general model where the orientation of different edges can be chosen with different probabilities. We show that a number of common tournament solutions, including the top cycle and the uncovered set, are still unlikely to rule out any alternative under this model. This corresponds to natural graph-theoretic conditions such as irreducibility of the tournament. In addition, we provide tight asymptotic bounds on the boundary of the probability range for which the tournament solutions select all alternatives with high probability.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Saile & Warut Suksompong, 2020. "Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 87-110, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:54:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01213-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01213-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mark Fey, 2008. "Choosing from a large tournament," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(2), pages 301-309, August.
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    5. Felix Brandt & Markus Brill & Hans Georg Seedig & Warut Suksompong, 2018. "On the structure of stable tournament solutions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 483-507, March.
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    7. I. Good, 1971. "A note on condorcet sets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 97-101, March.
    8. Felix Brandt & Hans Georg Seedig, 2016. "On the Discriminative Power of Tournament Solutions," Operations Research Proceedings, in: Marco Lübbecke & Arie Koster & Peter Letmathe & Reinhard Madlener & Britta Peis & Grit Walther (ed.), Operations Research Proceedings 2014, edition 1, pages 53-58, Springer.
    9. Bell, Colin E, 1981. "A Random Voting Graph Almost Surely Has a Hamiltonian Cycle When the Number of Alternatives Is Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1597-1603, November.
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