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Majority rule and tournament solutions

In: Handbook of Social Choice and Voting

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  • Scott Moser

Abstract

This Handbook provides an overview of interdisciplinary research related to social choice and voting that is intended for a broad audience. Expert contributors from various fields present critical summaries of the existing literature, including intuitive explanations of technical terminology and well-known theorems, suggesting new directions for research.

Suggested Citation

  • Scott Moser, 2015. "Majority rule and tournament solutions," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 6, pages 83-101, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15584_6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hudry, Olivier, 2009. "A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 292-303, May.
    2. Fishburn, P. C., 1983. "A new characterization of simple majority," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 31-35.
    3. Dutta, Bhaskar, 1988. "Covering sets and a new condorcet choice correspondence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 63-80, February.
    4. Brandt, Felix, 2011. "Minimal stable sets in tournaments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1481-1499, July.
    5. Fuad Aleskerov & Andrey Subochev, 2013. "Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 737-756, June.
    6. Mark Fey, 2008. "Choosing from a large tournament," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(2), pages 301-309, August.
    7. Olivier Hudry, 2004. "A note on “Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize” by G. J. Woeginger," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(1), pages 113-114, August.
    8. Ordeshook, Peter C. & Schwartz, Thomas, 1987. "Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 179-199, March.
    9. Amartya K. Sen, 1971. "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(3), pages 307-317.
    10. Gerhard J. Woeginger, 2003. "Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(3), pages 523-528, June.
    11. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
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