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King-chicken choice correspondences

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  • Costa, Matheus
  • Riella, Gil

Abstract

Given a complete, though not necessarily transitive, preference relation, we propose a family of choice representations inspired by the king-chicken procedure, according to which an alternative x is chosen among a set of alternatives A if, for every other alternative y in A, either x is preferred to y or there is another alternative z in A such that x is preferred to z, and z is preferred to y. We generalize this process by allowing the path from x to y to include more than one alternative z and fully characterize the choice correspondences that can be achieved through it. Two of the most relevant tournament solutions, the uncovered set and the top-cycle, are special cases of this generalized king-chicken choice procedure, so this work improves previous results that have appeared in the choice theory literature by delivering axiomatizations for those models in generic (not necessarily finite) choice spaces.

Suggested Citation

  • Costa, Matheus & Riella, Gil, 2022. "King-chicken choice correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 113-118.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:120:y:2022:i:c:p:113-118
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.10.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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