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A paradox of expert rights in abstract argumentation

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  • Nan Li

    (Southwestern University of Finance and Economics)

Abstract

This paper provides a “liberal paradox” that applies to the framework of abstract argumentation and complements the liberal paradox in preference aggregation. In abstract argumentation, arguments are viewed as abstract entities whose validities are determined according to a binary attack relation. When forming a collective attack relation, parts of it may be reserved to members of the society who hold expert knowledge. I prove that when only a binary evaluation of each argument is permitted, even under a minimal condition of rationality, the assignment of expert rights to two or more agents may be inconsistent with the condition of strong unanimity. Since argumentation aggregation is a particular case of judgement aggregation, this result might be a corollary of Dietrich and List (Soc Choice Welf 31(1):59–78, 2008), if the agenda I consider turns out to be connected in their sense, an issue that this paper has not been able to settle.

Suggested Citation

  • Nan Li, 2018. "A paradox of expert rights in abstract argumentation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(4), pages 737-752, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:51:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-018-1136-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1136-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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