Individual Powers and Social Consent: An Axiomatic Approach
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- Biung-Ghi Ju, 2010. "Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(4), pages 571-596, April.
- Biung-Ghi Ju, 2007. "Individual Powers and Social Consent: An Axiomatic Approach," Discussion Paper Series 0717, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
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- Murat Çengelci & M. Sanver, 2010. "Simple Collective Identity Functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 417-443, April.
- Balázs Sziklai, 2018.
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- Balazs Sziklai, 2015. "On how to identify experts in a community," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1549, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Cho, Wonki Jo & Park, Chang Woo, 2018. "Fractional group identification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 66-75.
- Cho, Wonki Jo & Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2020. "Group identification: An integrated approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 171-181.
- Miller, Alan D., 2013. "Community standards," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2696-2705.
- Cho, Wonki Jo & Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2017. "Multinary group identification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
- Cho, Wonki Jo, 2018. "Fairness in group identification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 35-40.
- Miller, Alan D., 2008. "Group identification," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 188-202, May.
- Susumu Cato & Stéphane Gonzalez & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2022. "Approval voting versus proportional threshold methods: so far and yet so near," Working Papers halshs-03858356, HAL.
- Cho, Wonki Jo & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2024. "On reaching social consent," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
- Yukinori Iwata, 2022. "Ranking nomination rules on the basis of nominating power distributions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(3), pages 382-401, September.
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More about this item
Keywords
Powers; Consent; Libertarian Rights; Monotonicity; Independence; Symmetric linkage; Symmetry; Pareto efficiency; Plurality;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DCM-2005-03-20 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-REG-2005-03-20 (Regulation)
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