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Consistent rights on property spaces

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  • Kretz, Claudio

Abstract

In many aggregation problems, subgroups of agents have the right to predetermine certain properties of the aggregate. Yet, such rights may be inconsistent. In preference aggregation, for example, the ‘liberal paradox’ refers to the incompatibility of minimal liberal rights with the Pareto principle (a right to society as a whole). We show that, in general, rights to properties are consistent if and only if the following simple condition holds. Whenever rights are given to a critical (i.e., minimally inconsistent) combination of properties, the respective rights holding groups must intersect to at least one common member. Rights are consistent with monotone independent aggregation (voting by properties) if and only if this condition holds under a suitable generalization of criticality. Our property formulation allows us to study a wide range of applications in social choice and judgment aggregation theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Kretz, Claudio, 2021. "Consistent rights on property spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:197:y:2021:i:c:s002205312100140x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105323
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marta Cardin, 2023. "Rights Systems and Aggregation Functions on Property Spaces," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(17), pages 1-10, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Expert rights; Liberal rights; Liberal paradox; Judgment aggregation; General aggregation theory; Effectivity function;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General

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