IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sochwe/v42y2014i1p17-30.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Implementation of Jefferson-d’Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee

Author

Listed:
  • Joaquín Pérez
  • Omar De la Cruz

Abstract

Same parliaments, to form a committee of size $$q$$ , use a voting process like the following: every parliamentary member votes for one out of a fixed set of candidates, and those $$q$$ candidates receiving more votes are elected for the committee. Assuming total discipline of vote, this is a game form in which players are the parliamentary groups. We investigate, according to some natural hypotheses about preferences, the likely distribution of the members of this committee. The main results are: (a) when fractional votes are allowed, there is a complete agreement between the distribution among the groups of the elected candidates that are outcomes of a Nash equilibrium and the distribution that, according to the size of the groups, would compute the Jefferson-d’Hondt allocation rule, and (b) when fractional votes are not allowed, there is a near agreement for a majority of situations. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Joaquín Pérez & Omar De la Cruz, 2014. "Implementation of Jefferson-d’Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 17-30, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:42:y:2014:i:1:p:17-30
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0718-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-012-0718-7
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00355-012-0718-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2004. "When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 55-75, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Omar de la Cruz Vicente & Fernando Tomé Bermejo & Rafael Ramiro Moreno, 2021. "A Disproportionality Bias in the Bureau of the Regional Assembly of Madrid," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-25, December.
    2. Karpov, Alexander, 2015. "Alliance incentives under the D’Hondt method," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 1-7.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    2. De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2004. "A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 41-54, January.
    3. Laurent Denant-Boemont & Enrico Diecidue & Olivier l’Haridon, 2017. "Patience and time consistency in collective decisions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(1), pages 181-208, March.
    4. Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & Xefteris, Dimitris, 2021. "Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes," SocArXiv ubk7p, Center for Open Science.
    5. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2008. "Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 401-417, April.
    6. Kei Kawai & Yasutora Watanabe, 2013. "Inferring Strategic Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 624-662, April.
    7. Amani Kahloul & Rim Lahmandi-Ayed & Hejer Lasram & Didier Laussel, 2017. "Democracy and competition: Vertical differentiation and labor in a general equilibrium model," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(4), pages 860-874, August.
    8. Le Borgne, Eric & Lockwood, Ben, 2000. "Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 582, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    9. Mr. Ben Lockwood & Mr. Eric Le Borgne, 2003. "Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Experimentation vs. Career Concerns," IMF Working Papers 2003/057, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.
    11. Wagner, Alexander K. & Granic, Dura-Georg, 2017. "Tie-Breaking Power in Committees," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168187, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    12. Christian Basteck, 2016. "Scoring rules and implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Working Papers 2016002, Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS).
    13. Lucia Buenrostro & Amrita Dhillon & Peter Vida, 2013. "Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 329-352, February.
    14. Michela Redoano, 2010. "Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 407-435, June.
    15. Dellis, Arnaud, 2010. "Weak undominance in scoring rule elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 110-119, January.
    16. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2012. "Scoring Rules: A Game-Theoretical Analysis," Discussion Papers 2012-40, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    17. Sébastien Courtin & Matías Núñez, 2017. "Dominance solvable approval voting games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(6), pages 1047-1068, December.
    18. Elkind, Edith & Grandi, Umberto & Rossi, Francesca & Slinko, Arkadii, 2020. "Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in k-approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 193-205.
    19. Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2004. "When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 55-75, January.
    20. M. Braham & F. Steffen, 2007. "The Chairman’s Paradox Revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(2), pages 231-253, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:42:y:2014:i:1:p:17-30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.