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A social choice theory of legitimacy

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  • John Patty
  • Elizabeth Penn

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  • John Patty & Elizabeth Penn, 2011. "A social choice theory of legitimacy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 365-382, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:36:y:2011:i:3:p:365-382
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0509-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dutta, Bhaskar, 1988. "Covering sets and a new condorcet choice correspondence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 63-80, February.
    2. Elizabeth Penn, 2006. "Alternate Definitions of the Uncovered Set and Their Implications," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 83-87, August.
    3. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
    4. Farrar, Cynthia & Fishkin, James S. & Green, Donald P. & List, Christian & Luskin, Robert C. & Levy Paluck, Elizabeth, 2010. "Disaggregating Deliberation’s Effects: An Experiment within a Deliberative Poll," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(2), pages 333-347, April.
    5. Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-Francois Laslier, 1999. "Comparison functions and choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 513-532.
    6. Dryzek, John S. & List, Christian, 2003. "Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 1-28, January.
    7. Mackie,Gerry, 2003. "Democracy Defended," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521827089, November.
    8. Ordeshook, Peter C. & Schwartz, Thomas, 1987. "Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 179-199, March.
    9. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
    10. Mackie,Gerry, 2003. "Democracy Defended," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521534314, November.
    11. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Durand, François & Macé, Antonin & Núñez, Matías, 2024. "Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 1-34.

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