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Computational application of the mathematical theory of democracy to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (how dictatorial are Arrow’s dictators?)

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  • Andranik Tangian

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  • Andranik Tangian, 2010. "Computational application of the mathematical theory of democracy to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (how dictatorial are Arrow’s dictators?)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(1), pages 129-161, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:35:y:2010:i:1:p:129-161
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-009-0433-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John Geanakoplos, 2005. "Three brief proofs of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(1), pages 211-215, July.
    2. Andranik Tangian, 2008. "A mathematical model of Athenian democracy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 537-572, December.
    3. B. Monjardet, 1978. "An Axiomatic Theory of Tournament Aggregation," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 3(4), pages 334-351, November.
    4. Kelly, Jerry S., 1978. "Arrow Impossibility Theorems," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780124033504 edited by Shell, Karl.
    5. Antonio Quesada, 2007. "1 dictator=2 voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 395-400, March.
    6. Reny, Philip J., 2001. "Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 99-105, January.
    7. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Greg Fried, 2014. "Taking dictatorship seriously: a reply to Quesada," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 243-251, January.

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