Implementability via protective equilibria
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- Josué Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2022.
"Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(4), pages 969-988, November.
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- Josue Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2019. "Obvious Manipulations in Cake-Cutting," Papers 1908.02988, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2019.
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Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 91-113, September.
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"The greatest unhappiness of the least number,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(3), pages 637-655, December.
- Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2016. "The greatest unhappiness of the least number," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(1), pages 187-205, June.
- Anna Bogomolnaia & Ron Holzman & Hervé Moulin, 2021.
"Worst Case in Voting and Bargaining,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
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- Anna Bogomolnaia & Ron Holzman & Hervé Moulin, 2021. "Worst Case in Voting and Bargaining," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 21012, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Anna Bogomolnaia & Ron Holzman & Hervé Moulin, 2021. "Worst Case in Voting and Bargaining," Post-Print halshs-03196999, HAL.
- Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée & Triossi, Matteo, 2022. "Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
- Federico Fioravanti & Ulle Endriss, 2024. "Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti-Plurality Classes," Papers 2404.17413, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Barberà, S. & Dutta, B., 1995.
"Protective behavior in matching models,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 281-296.
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- Matthew O. Jackson & Sanjay Srivastava, 1996.
"A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions Which Lead to Impossibility Theorems,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(1), pages 23-38.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Sanjay Srivastava, 1992. "Characterizations of Game Theoretic Solutions which Lead to Impossibility Theorems," Discussion Papers 1004, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Holzman, Ron & Moulin, Hervé, 2023. "On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
- Ronan Congar & Vincent Merlin, 2012.
"A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(1), pages 131-147, January.
- Ronan Congar & Vincent Merlin, 2012. "A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting," Post-Print halshs-00554833, HAL.
- Fiestras-Janeiro, G. & Borm, P.E.M. & van Megen, F.J.C., 1996.
"Protective Behavior in Games,"
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1996-12, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Fiestras-Janeiro, G. & Borm, P.E.M. & van Megen, F.J.C., 1996. "Protective Behavior in Games," Other publications TiSEM 0f0d5aed-021d-45d8-9776-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Fiestras-Janeiro, G. & Borm, P.E.M. & van Megen, F.J.C., 1998. "Protective behavior in games," Other publications TiSEM 92723c0f-5357-4985-9733-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz, 2013.
"Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(1), pages 1-22, March.
- Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz, 2010. "Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment," Harvard Business School Working Papers 10-093, Harvard Business School.
- Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz, 2010. "Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment," Working Papers 447, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz, 2010. "Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 816.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Anna Bogomolnaia & Hervé Moulin, 2023.
"Guarantees in Fair Division: General or Monotone Preferences,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 48(1), pages 160-176, February.
- Anna bogomolnaia & Herve Moulin, 2019. "Guarantees in Fair Division: general or monotone preferences," Papers 1911.10009, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
- Anna Bogomolnaia & Hervé Moulin, 2022. "Guarantees in Fair Division: General or Monotone Preferences," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03886828, HAL.
- Anna Bogomolnaia & Hervé Moulin, 2022. "Guarantees in Fair Division: General or Monotone Preferences," Post-Print hal-03886828, HAL.
- Anna Bogomolnaia & Hervé Moulin, 2020. "Guarantees in Fair Division: general or monotone preferences," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03047407, HAL.
- Anna Bogomolnaia & Hervé Moulin, 2020. "Guarantees in Fair Division: general or monotone preferences," Working Papers hal-03047407, HAL.
- Anna bogomolnaia Ron Holzman Herve Moulin, 2021. "Wost Case in Voting and Bargaining," Papers 2104.02316, arXiv.org.
- Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria & Borm, Peter & van Megen, Freek, 1998. "Protective and Prudent Behaviour in Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 167-175, January.
- Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2012.
"Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 490-509.
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2011. "Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient?," Working Papers 598, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2011. "Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 892.11, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Naeve, Jorg, 2000. "Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 313-325, November.
- Nicoló, Antonio & Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo, 2012. "Transplant quality and patientsʼ preferences in paired kidney exchange," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 299-310.
- José García-Lapresta & A. Marley & Miguel Martínez-Panero, 2010. "Characterizing best–worst voting systems in the scoring context," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(3), pages 487-496, March.
- Federico Fioravanti & Ulle Endriss, 2024. "Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti-Plurality Classes," Working Papers 329, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Salvador Barberà, 2010.
"Strategy-proof social choice,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," Working Papers 420, Barcelona School of Economics.
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