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Die Entwicklung der betriebswirtschaftlichen Corporate Governance-Forschung im deutschsprachigen Raum — Eine State of the Art-Analyse auf der Basis bibliometrischer Daten

Author

Listed:
  • Marc Eulerich

    (Universität Duisburg-Essen)

  • Christian Lohmann

    (Bergische Universität Wuppertal)

  • Stefanie Haustein

    (Universität Duisburg-Essen)

  • Dirk Tunger

    (Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Corporate Governance hat in der betriebswirtschaftlichen Forschung in den letzten beiden Dekaden kontinuierlich an Bedeutung gewonnen. Ungeachtet dessen wird die Corporate Governance-Forschung nach wie vor als weitestgehend unsystematischer, in viele Einzelthemen zerfallener Strang der betriebswirtschaftlichen Literatur wahrgenommen. Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert empirisch die Entwicklung der betriebswirtschaftlichen Corporate Governance-Forschung im deutschsprachigen Raum. Als Datenbasis für eine Zitations-, Kozitations- und Clusteranalyse dienen 267 Corporate Governance-Beiträge mit mehr als 10.000 Zitationen. Die erhobenen Daten werden in sechs Cluster zur Darstellung der thematischen Schwerpunkte der betriebswirtschaftlichen Corporate Governance-Forschung unterteilt und als Kozitationsnetzwerk visuell dargestellt. Zudem wird die historische Entwicklung der betriebswirtschaftlichen Corporate Governance-Forschung herausgearbeitet, indem die 267 herangezogenen Corporate Governance-Beiträge den sechs Clustern unter Berucksichtigung des Publikationszeitpunktes zugeordnet werden.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Eulerich & Christian Lohmann & Stefanie Haustein & Dirk Tunger, 2014. "Die Entwicklung der betriebswirtschaftlichen Corporate Governance-Forschung im deutschsprachigen Raum — Eine State of the Art-Analyse auf der Basis bibliometrischer Daten," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 66(7), pages 567-600, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:66:y:2014:i:7:d:10.1007_bf03372907
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372907
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    C38; G34; N01;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C38 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Classification Methdos; Cluster Analysis; Principal Components; Factor Analysis
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • N01 - Economic History - - General - - - Development of the Discipline: Historiographical; Sources and Methods

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