Michael Jensen-la théorie positive de l’agence et ses applications à l’architecture et à la gouvernance des organisations
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- Gérard Charreaux, 2008. "Michael Jensen - la théorie positive de l'agence et ses applications à l'architecture et à la gouvernance des organisations," Post-Print halshs-00338038, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Jensen, Michael C & Meckling, William H, 1979. "Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 469-506, October.
- repec:bla:jfinan:v:43:y:1988:i:3:p:567-91 is not listed on IDEAS
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"Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function,"
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- Michael C. Jensen, 2001. "Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, And The Corporate Objective Function," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 14(3), pages 8-21, September.
- Michael Jensen, 2001. "Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 7(3), pages 297-317, September.
- Jensen, Michael C., 2002. "Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 235-256, April.
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"The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems,"
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 43-58, January.
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- Michael C. Jensen, 1994. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, And The Failure Of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 6(4), pages 4-23, January.
- Gérard Charreaux, 2000.
"La théorie positive de l'agence : positionnement et apports,"
Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 193-214.
- Gérard Charreaux, 1999. "La théorie positive de l'agence:positionnement et apports," Working Papers CREGO 0991201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
- Karen Hopper Wruck & Michael C. jensen, 1997.
"Science, Specific Knowledge, And Total Quality Management,"
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 10(2), pages 8-23, June.
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- Gérard Charreaux, 2001. "Michael Jensen:Le pionnier de la finance organisationnelle," Working Papers CREGO 1010201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Michael C. Jensen, 1991. "Corporate Control And The Politics Of Finance," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 4(2), pages 13-34, June.
- William H. Meckling, 1976. "Values and the Choice of the Model of the Individual in the Social Sciences," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 112(IV), pages 545-560, December.
- Michel Albouy & Gérard Charreaux, 2017. "Les grands auteurs en finance," Post-Print hal-01621326, HAL.
- Baker, G.P. & Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Compensation And Incentives: Practice Vs. Theory," Papers 88-05, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
- Fama, Eugene F. & Jensen, Michael C., 1985. "Organizational forms and investment decisions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 101-119, March.
- Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
- Michael C. Jensen & William H. Heckling, 1995. "Specific And General Knowledge, And Organizational Structure," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 8(2), pages 4-18, June.
- Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990.
"Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
- Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
- Brunner, Karl & Meckling, William H, 1977. "The Perception of Man and the Conception of Government," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(1), pages 70-85, February.
- Gérard Charreaux, 1998. "La théorie positive de l'agence:lecture et relectures..," Working Papers CREGO 0980901, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
- Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, 2010.
"CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How,"
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 64-76, January.
- Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Ceo Incentives — It'S Not How Much You Pay, But How," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 3(3), pages 36-49, September.
- Michael C. Jensen, 1994. "Self‐Interest, Altruism, Incentives, And Agency Theory," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 7(2), pages 40-45, June.
- Michael C. Jensen, 2003. "Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 9(3), pages 379-406, September.
- Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, 1961. "Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34, pages 411-411.
- Demsetz, Harold, 1988. "The Theory of the Firm Revisited," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 141-161, Spring.
- Fama, Eugene F, et al, 1969. "The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, February.
- Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 1994. "The Nature Of Man," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 7(2), pages 4-19, June.
- Michael C. Jensen, 2004. "The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 10(4), pages 549-565, December.
- Michael C. Jensen, 2005. "Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 34(1), Spring.
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Cited by:
- Ghazi Zouari, 2011. "Specific knowledge, investment decision and organizational architecture," Working Papers CREGO 1110501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
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More about this item
Keywords
théorie positive de l'agence; architecture organisationnelle; gouvernance d'entreprise; valeur de marché; budget; rémunérations des dirigeants;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L29 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Other
- M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
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