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Gewollte und ungewollte Anreizwirkungen von variablen Löhnen: Disziplinierung der Agenten oder Crowding-Out?

Author

Listed:
  • Antoinette Weibel

    (Universität Zürich)

  • Katja Rost

    (Universität Zürich)

  • Margit Osterloh

    (Universität Zürich)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Seit längerer Zeit wird kontrovers über die Auswirkung variabler, leistungsbezogener Entlohnung auf das Arbeitsverhalten diskutiert. Wir untersuchen mit einem experimentellen Vignettendesign in einem berufsnahen Kontext, wie variable Löhne die handlungsauslösende Ursachenzuschreibung verschieben und welche Effekte diese Verschiebung auf Verhaltensintentionen ausübt. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass variable Entlohnung zum einen den gewünschten Preiseffekt erzielt: Sie löst eine Belohnungs- bzw. Bestrafungsorientierung aus und steigert die beabsichtigte Arbeitsanstrengung. Zum anderen führt variable Entlohnung zu einem Verdrängungseffekt: Verinnerlichte Normen oder die Freude an einer Tätigkeit weichen der Belohnungs- und Bestrafungsorientierung. Die beabsichtigte Arbeitsanstrengung sinkt. Wir messen diese nicht beobachtbaren Auswirkungen von Preis- und Verdrängungseffekt auf Arbeitsanstrengungen und diskutieren die Auswirkung leistungsbezogener Entlohnung auf das Arbeitsverhalten als Totaleffekt der beiden gegenläufigen Effekte. Der Beitrag trägt zur aktuellen Diskussion über die Wirkung von variablen Leistungslöhnen auf drei Arten bei. Wir zeigen: (1) Variable Leistungslöhne lösen stets simultan einen Preis- und einen Verdrängungseffekt aus. (2) Das standardökonomische Modell kommt nur dann zu korrekten Verhaltensprognosen, wenn der Preiseffekt Arbeitsanstrengungen stärker beeinflusst als der simultan wirkende Verdrängungseffekt. (3) Die Kosten variabler Löhne sind höher als in der Standardökonomik angenommen: Variable Löhne ziehen stets einen nicht beobachtbaren Verdrängungseffekt nach sich.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoinette Weibel & Katja Rost & Margit Osterloh, 2007. "Gewollte und ungewollte Anreizwirkungen von variablen Löhnen: Disziplinierung der Agenten oder Crowding-Out?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 59(8), pages 1029-1054, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:59:y:2007:i:8:d:10.1007_bf03372787
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372787
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crowding-Out; Motivation; Pay for Performance; Vignette Study;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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