IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/scient/v126y2021i1d10.1007_s11192-020-03693-1.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Quality censoring in peer review

Author

Listed:
  • J. A. Garcia

    (Universidad de Granada)

  • Rosa Rodriguez-Sánchez

    (Universidad de Granada)

  • J. Fdez-Valdivia

    (Universidad de Granada)

Abstract

In a typical scenario in which a peer-reviewed journal has to match the uncertain manuscript’s quality with its quality standard, quality improvement is restricted by the journal’s quality standard. This is so because the reviewer usually seeks to ensure that the manuscript’s quality acceptably matches the journal’s standard. Think, for example, of a mega-journal that has peer reviews for “technical correctness only” and not for novelty or impact on the field. However, the presence of quality improvement constraints not only leads to the quality of the review outcome being limited by the journal’s quality standard, it also leads to the issue of imperfect observability of that quality. If the quality of the revised manuscript happens to be above the journal’s quality standard, the journal generally cannot determine the actual level of quality achieved. In sum, the journal’s standard level of scientific quality introduces a limitation to the quality outcome of the review process. We call this phenomenon “quality censoring” in peer review. This reduces the reviewer’s motivation to work hard to increase the quality of the review outcome when such outcomes of high quality cannot be observed due to a journal’s limited standard. In this short communication, we show that the ignorance of quality censoring is behind a zero probability of payment for the reviewer.

Suggested Citation

  • J. A. Garcia & Rosa Rodriguez-Sánchez & J. Fdez-Valdivia, 2021. "Quality censoring in peer review," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 126(1), pages 825-830, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:scient:v:126:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s11192-020-03693-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11192-020-03693-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11192-020-03693-1
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11192-020-03693-1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard Van Noorden, 2013. "Open access: The true cost of science publishing," Nature, Nature, vol. 495(7442), pages 426-429, March.
    2. J. A. Garcia & Rosa Rodriguez-Sánchez & J. Fdez-Valdivia, 2020. "The author–reviewer game," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 124(3), pages 2409-2431, September.
    3. Tinglong Dai & Kinshuk Jerath, 2016. "Technical Note—Impact of Inventory on Quota-Bonus Contracts with Rent Sharing," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(1), pages 94-98, February.
    4. Oyer, Paul, 2000. "A Theory of Sales Quotas with Limited Liability and Rent Sharing," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 405-426, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. J. A. Garcia & Rosa Rodriguez-Sánchez & J. Fdez-Valdivia, 2021. "The interplay between the reviewer’s incentives and the journal’s quality standard," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 126(4), pages 3041-3061, April.
    2. Stephan Puehringer & Johanna Rath & Teresa Griesebner, 2021. "The political economy of academic publishing: On the commodification of a public good," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(6), pages 1-21, June.
    3. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018. "Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 16, pages 453-485, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Le, Tam-Tri & Nguyen, Minh-Hoang, 2022. "Tra cứu nhanh về hai chủ đề quan trọng với học giới," OSF Preprints b4sma, Center for Open Science.
    5. Mario Pagliaro, 2021. "Purposeful Evaluation of Scholarship in the Open Science Era," Challenges, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-11, February.
    6. Levenson, Alec R. & Zoghi, Cindy & Gibbs, Michael & Benson, George, 2011. "Optimizing Incentive Plan Design: A Case Study," IZA Discussion Papers 5985, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Reggie Raju & Jaya Raju & Jill Claassen, 2015. "Open Scholarship Practices Reshaping South Africa’s Scholarly Publishing Roadmap," Publications, MDPI, vol. 3(4), pages 1-22, December.
    8. George Georgiadis & Balazs Szentes, 2020. "Optimal Monitoring Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 2075-2107, September.
    9. Herweg, Fabian & Rosato, Antonio, 2018. "Bait and Ditch: Consumer Naiveté and Salesforce Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12612, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Green, Colin P. & Heywood, John S., 2010. "Profit sharing and the quality of relations with the boss," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 859-867, October.
    11. Victor Gonzalez-Jimenez & Patricio S. Dalton & Charles N. Noussair, 2019. "The Dark Side of Monetary Bonuses: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Vienna Economics Papers vie1909, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    12. John G. Sessions & John D. Skåtun, 2022. "Luck in a Flat Hierarchy: Wages, Bonuses and Noise," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 98(323), pages 373-391, December.
    13. Kuhn, Peter J. & Yu, Lizi, 2021. "Kinks as Goals: Accelerating Commissions and the Performance of Sales Teams," IZA Discussion Papers 14115, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Fabian Herweg & Daniel Muller & Philipp Weinschenk, 2010. "Binary Payment Schemes: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2451-2477, December.
    15. Francis de Véricourt & Denis Gromb, 2014. "Financing capacity investment under demand uncertainty," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-14-03, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
    16. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2016. "Optimal sales force compensation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 179-195.
    17. Riccardo Vecchio, 2022. "Fostering the debate among scholars to support the advancement of knowledge in the food-related consumer research: A commentary," Economia agro-alimentare, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 24(2), pages 1-15.
    18. Ulbricht, Robert, 2016. "Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
    19. Rongzhu Ke & Xinyi Xu, 2023. "The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(2), pages 375-416, August.
    20. Rosenthal, Maxwell, 2023. "Robust incentives for risk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:scient:v:126:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s11192-020-03693-1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.