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Political-economic problems in trade capacity building

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  • Johannes Urpelainen

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  • Johannes Urpelainen, 2009. "Political-economic problems in trade capacity building," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 329-359, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:4:y:2009:i:4:p:329-359
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-009-9068-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Susan Prowse, 2002. "The Role of International and National Agencies in Trade–related Capacity Building," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(9), pages 1235-1261, September.
    2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    3. Rosendorff, B. Peter, 2005. "Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 389-400, August.
    4. Ludema, Rodney D., 2001. "Optimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement procedures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 355-376, June.
    5. Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann & Thierry Verdier, 2007. "Aid and trade," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 23(3), pages 481-507, Autumn.
    6. repec:bla:worlde:v:23:y:2000:i:04:p:511-525 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. William Easterly, 2002. "The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262550423, April.
    8. Hoekman, Bernard, 2002. "Strengthening the global trade architecture for development: the post Doha agenda," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 23-45, March.
    9. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    10. Chad P. Bown, 2004. "Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 59-80, January.
    11. Smith, James McCall, 2000. "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(1), pages 137-180, January.
    12. Henson, Spencer & Loader, Rupert, 2001. "Barriers to Agricultural Exports from Developing Countries: The Role of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Requirements," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 85-102, January.
    13. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    14. Krishna, Pravin & Panagariya, Arvind, 2000. "A unification of second best results in international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 235-257, December.
    15. Hoekman, Bernard, 2002. "Strengthening the global trade architecture for development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2757, The World Bank.
    16. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    17. Jakob Svensson, 2000. "Foreign aid and rent-seeking," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 165-189, Springer.
    18. Harry G. Johnson, 1953. "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 21(2), pages 142-153.
    19. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith, 2007. "Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(2), pages 251-284, April.
    20. Kono, Daniel Y., 2006. "Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(3), pages 369-384, August.
    21. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
    22. Chad P. Bown, 2005. "Participation in," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 19(2), pages 287-310.
    23. Keohane, Robert O., 1986. "Reciprocity in international relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(1), pages 1-27, January.
    24. Koremenos, Barbara & Lipson, Charles & Snidal, Duncan, 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 761-799, October.
    25. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chun-Chieh Wang, 2011. "Aid for trade as a public good," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(6), pages 711-728, September.
    2. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "Domestic reform as a rationale for gradualism in international cooperation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(3), pages 400-427, July.
    3. Sena Kimm Gnangnon, 2019. "Effect of Aid for Trade Policy and Regulations on Tariff Policy Volatility: Does Institutional and Governance Quality Matter?," Economies, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-19, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trade capacity building; Development assistance; International cooperation; F35; F53; O19;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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