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Geopolitics, Aid and Growth

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  • Dreher, Axel
  • Eichenauer, Vera

Abstract

We investigate the effects of short-term political motivations on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Donor countries? political motives might reduce the effectiveness of conditionality, channel aid to inferior projects, reduce the aid bureaucracy?s effort, and change the power structure in the recipient country. We investigate whether geopolitical motives matter by testing whether the effect of aid on economic growth is reduced by the share of years a country has served on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the period the aid has been committed, which provides quasi-random variation in commitments. Our results show that the effect of aid on growth is significantly lower when aid has been granted for political reasons. We derive two conclusions from this. First, short-term political favoritism reduces growth. Second, political interest variables are invalid instruments for aid, raising doubts about a large number of results in the aid effectiveness literature.

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  • Dreher, Axel & Eichenauer, Vera, 2014. "Geopolitics, Aid and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 9904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9904
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Aid effectiveness; Economic growth; Political instruments; Politics and aid; United nations security council membership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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