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State Strategies in International Bargaining

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  • McKibben,Heather Elko

Abstract

Bargaining between states in the international system is governed by rules which shape and constrain their bargaining behavior. However, these rules can be changed. When, why, and how do states bargain differently? Drawing on original qualitative and quantitative evidence, this book demonstrates how the rules of the game influence the cooperative or coercive nature of the strategies adopted by all states in a negotiation. These effects influence each state's incentives regarding whether to play by the rules or to change them. Examining these incentives, as well as the conditions under which states can act on them, McKibben explains the wide variation in states' bargaining strategies. Several bargaining interactions are analyzed, including decision-making in the European Union, multilateral trade negotiations, climate change negotiations, and negotiations over the future status of Kosovo. This book provides a rich understanding of the nuances of states' behavior in international bargaining processes.

Suggested Citation

  • McKibben,Heather Elko, 2015. "State Strategies in International Bargaining," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107086098.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9781107086098
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    Cited by:

    1. Ana Garriga, 2015. "Leonardo Baccini and Johannes Urpelainen. 2014. Cutting the Gordian Knot of Economic Reform. When and How International Institutions Help (New York: Oxford University Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 409-412, September.
    2. Daniel Verdier, 2022. "Bargaining strategies for governance complex games," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 349-371, April.
    3. Christoph Mikulaschek, 2018. "Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries’ temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 491-518, December.
    4. Heather Elko McKibben & Amy Skoll, 2021. "Please Help Us (or Don’t): External Interventions and Negotiated Settlements in Civil Conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 65(2-3), pages 480-505, February.

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