IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/revint/v19y2024i3d10.1007_s11558-024-09538-3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Your silence speaks volumes: Weak states and strategic absence in the UN General Assembly

Author

Listed:
  • Julia C. Morse

    (University of California)

  • Bridget Coggins

    (University of California)

Abstract

Country participation in one-state, one-vote forums like the United Nations General Assembly often reflects underlying power asymmetries and endogenous political processes. Voting alignment is undoubtedly an important preference indicator. However, this paper contends that it is incomplete; silence is politically significant as well. Weak states use absence as a form of institutional power that shields them from geopolitical pressure and competing-principals problems. While abstention is a public signal of neutrality that undercuts voting unanimity, the ambiguous intent of absence makes it a distinct form of political expression. We examine the politics of absences at the General Assembly, highlighting how states may be strategically absent from select votes for political reasons. Building on the Bailey et al. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(2), 430–456, 2017 roll-call voting data, we distinguish strategic absences from other types of absence and provide evidence that such behavior is linked to US interests and competing-principals problems. Taking these non-random reasons for missingness into account provides a fuller picture of how weak states engage with international institutions and highlights how silence can be a consequence of larger political processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Julia C. Morse & Bridget Coggins, 2024. "Your silence speaks volumes: Weak states and strategic absence in the UN General Assembly," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 515-544, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:19:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s11558-024-09538-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09538-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11558-024-09538-3
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11558-024-09538-3?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John R. Oneal & Bruce Russett, 1999. "Is the liberal peace just an artifact of cold war interests? Assessing recent critiques," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(3), pages 213-241, March.
    2. Thompson, Alexander, 2006. "Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 1-34, January.
    3. Voeten, Erik, 2005. "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 527-557, July.
    4. Abdul Noury, 2004. "Abstention in Daylight: Strategic Calculus of Voting in the European Parliament," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 179-211, October.
    5. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 1-18, January.
    6. Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Rainer Thiele, 2008. "Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 139-164, July.
    7. Guillermo Rosas & Yael Shomer & Stephen R. Haptonstahl, 2015. "No News Is News: Nonignorable Nonresponse in Roll‐Call Data Analysis," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(2), pages 511-528, February.
    8. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2015. "Politics and IMF Conditionality," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 59(1), pages 120-148, February.
    9. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 742-757, October.
    10. Dreher, Axel & Jensen, Nathan M., 2013. "Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 183-196.
    11. Tallberg, Jonas & Sommerer, Thomas & Squatrito, Theresa & Jönsson, Christer, 2014. "Explaining the Transnational Design of International Organizations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(4), pages 741-774, October.
    12. Abdul Ghafar Noury, 2004. "Abstention in the daylight: strategic calculus of voting in the EP," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7754, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    13. Bearce, David H. & Bondanella, Stacy, 2007. "Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 703-733, October.
    14. Carter, David B. & Stone, Randall W., 2015. "Democracy and Multilateralism: The Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 1-33, January.
    15. Johns, Leslie, 2007. "A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 245-275, April.
    16. Paul Novosad & Eric Werker, 2019. "Who runs the international system? Nationality and leadership in the United Nations Secretariat," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-33, March.
    17. Carter, David B. & Signorino, Curtis S., 2010. "Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(3), pages 271-292, July.
    18. Kenneth A. Schultz & Justin S. Mankin, 2019. "Is Temperature Exogenous? The Impact of Civil Conflict on the Instrumental Climate Record in Sub‐Saharan Africa," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(4), pages 723-739, October.
    19. Voeten, Erik, 2001. "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(4), pages 845-858, December.
    20. Ilyana Kuziemko & Eric Werker, 2006. "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 905-930, October.
    21. Abramson, Scott F & Carter, David B., 2021. "Systemic Instability and the Emergence of Border Disputes," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 103-146, January.
    22. Lall, Ranjit, 2016. "How Multiple Imputation Makes a Difference," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(4), pages 414-433.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Brian Lai & Vanessa A. Lefler, 2017. "Examining the role of region and elections on representation in the UN Security Council," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 585-611, December.
    2. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2015. "Politics and IMF Conditionality," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 59(1), pages 120-148, February.
    3. Juan Duque & Michael Jetter & Santiago Sosa, 2015. "UN interventions: The role of geography," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 67-95, March.
    4. Axel Dreher & Stephan Klasen & James Raymond Vreeland & Eric Werker, 2013. "The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective?," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(1), pages 157-191.
    5. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith, 2010. "The Pernicious Consequences of UN Security Council Membership," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(5), pages 667-686, October.
    6. Dreher, Axel & Lang, Valentin & Reinsberg, Bernhard, 2024. "Aid effectiveness and donor motives," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
    7. Axel Dreher & Valentin F. Lang & B. Peter Rosendorff & James Raymond Vreeland, 2018. "Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work-Hypothesis," CESifo Working Paper Series 7329, CESifo.
    8. Axel Dreher & Sarah Langlotz & Silvia Marchesi, 2017. "Information Transmission And Ownership Consolidation In Aid Programs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1671-1688, October.
    9. Ariel Akerman & João Paulo Pessoa & Leonardo Weller, 2022. "The West’s Teeth: IMF conditionality during the Cold War," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(7), pages 2034-2051, July.
    10. Ambrocio, Gene & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2019. "Friends for the benefits: The effects of political ties on sovereign borrowing conditions," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 13/2019, Bank of Finland.
    11. Axel Dreher & Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen & James Vreeland, 2014. "The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 51-83, January.
    12. Axel Dreher & Katharina Michaelowa, 2008. "The political economy of international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 331-334, December.
    13. Ambrocio, Gene & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2019. "Friends for the benefits: The effects of political ties on sovereign borrowing conditions," Research Discussion Papers 13/2019, Bank of Finland.
    14. Ambrocio, Gene & Gu, Xian & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2022. "Political ties and raising capital in global markets: Evidence from Yankee bonds," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    15. Raphael Becker & Arye Hillman & Niklas Potrafke & Alexander Schwemmer, 2015. "The preoccupation of the United Nations with Israel: Evidence and theory," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 413-437, December.
    16. Timothy McKeown, 2009. "How U.S. decision-makers assessed their control of multilateral organizations, 1957–1982," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 269-291, September.
    17. Axel Dreher & James Raymond Vreeland, 2011. "Buying Votes and International Organizations," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 78, Courant Research Centre PEG.
    18. Alexander Baturo & Julia Gray, 2024. "Leaders in the United Nations General Assembly: Revitalization or politicization?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 721-752, October.
    19. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 742-757, October.
    20. repec:got:cegedp:97 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Axel Dreher & Vera Eichenauer & Kai Gehring & Vera Z. Eichenauer, 2013. "Geopolitics, Aid and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 4299, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    International organizations; United Nations; General Assembly; Absence; Voting; Ideal point estimates; Preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:19:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s11558-024-09538-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.