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Balancing design objectives: Analyzing new data on voting rules in intergovernmental organizations

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  • Daniel Blake
  • Autumn Payton

Abstract

This article presents a new data set on one of the most visible features of institutional design - voting rules. The data set covers 266 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that vary in size and substantive scope and includes data on IGO issue area and founding membership characteristics that complement the measures on voting rules. The article outlines the characteristics and categorization of voting rules in the data set and establishes the broader importance of voting rules by illustrating how they help states achieve four core institutional design objectives: control, compliance, responsiveness, and effective membership. The utility of the data set and patterns in the relationships between its variables are identified through the evaluation of preliminary propositions connecting institutional context and voting rule selection. The preliminary findings emerging from this analysis establish a platform for further analyses of voting rules in IGOs, as well as other dimensions of the design and function of IGOs. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

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  • Daniel Blake & Autumn Payton, 2015. "Balancing design objectives: Analyzing new data on voting rules in intergovernmental organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 377-402, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:10:y:2015:i:3:p:377-402
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-014-9201-9
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