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More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: Response to Moser

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  • Tsebelis, George

Abstract

Moser analyzes the cooperation procedure using a model that assumes (1) one dimension and (2) complete information. I show that because of these two restrictive assumptions and his misunderstanding of the strategic implications of Article 189a(1) of the Maastricht Treaty (an article also present in the Single European Act and the Treaty of Rome), Moser's conclusions are mistaken. In particular, his predicted outcomes are incorrect, and his major institutional prediction (that the European Parliament plays no role in decision making except in the second round of the cooperation procedure) is contradicted by thousands of parliamentary amendments, the major part of which are accepted in the first round.

Suggested Citation

  • Tsebelis, George, 1996. "More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: Response to Moser," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 839-844, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:04:p:839-844_20
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    Cited by:

    1. Attila Kovács, 2013. "New Ways for Companies to Develop Effective Lobbying Strategies in the European Parliament A case study in the field of the Common Agricultural Policy," Proceedings of FIKUSZ '13, in: Pál Michelberger (ed.),Proceedings of FIKUSZ '13, pages 77-96, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
    2. Mika Widgrén, 2003. "Enlargements and the Principles of Designing EU - Decision-Making Procedures," CESifo Working Paper Series 903, CESifo.
    3. A Jones & J R A Clark, 1999. "The European Parliament: Agenda Territories and Agri-Environment Policymaking," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 17(2), pages 127-144, April.
    4. Christophe Crombez, 2000. "Institutional Reform and Co-Decision in the European Union," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 41-57, March.
    5. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2002. "Strategic Power Revisited," CESifo Working Paper Series 736, CESifo.
    6. Napel, Stefan & Widgrén, Mika, 2017. "Power measurement as sensitivity analysis: a unified approach," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 345, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    7. Christophe Crombez & Pieterjan Vangerven, 2014. "Procedural models of European Union politics: Contributions and suggestions for improvement," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(2), pages 289-308, June.
    8. Christian B. Jensen, 2007. "Implementing Europe," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(4), pages 451-477, December.
    9. Geoffrey Garrett & George Tsebelis, 1999. "Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 291-308, July.
    10. Keith Dowding, 2000. "Institutionalist Research on the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 1(1), pages 125-144, February.
    11. Daniel Blake & Autumn Payton, 2015. "Balancing design objectives: Analyzing new data on voting rules in intergovernmental organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 377-402, September.
    12. Dirk Junge & Thomas König, 2007. "What's Wrong With Eu Spatial Analysis?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(4), pages 465-487, October.
    13. Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.
    14. Jonathan Rodden, 2002. "Strength in Numbers?," European Union Politics, , vol. 3(2), pages 151-175, June.
    15. Mika Widgren, 2003. "Power in the Design of Constitutional Rules," European Economy Group Working Papers 23, European Economy Group.
    16. Mikko Mattila & Jan-Erik Lane, 2001. "Why Unanimity in the Council?," European Union Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 31-52, February.
    17. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgren, 2004. "Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(4), pages 517-538, October.
    18. Serra Boranbay-Akan & Thomas König & Moritz Osnabrügge, 2017. "The imperfect agenda-setter: Why do legislative proposals fail in the EU decision-making process?," European Union Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 168-187, June.
    19. Frans Stokman & Robert Thomson, 2004. "Winners and Losers in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 5-23, March.
    20. Bernard Steunenberg & Dieter Schmidtchen & Christian Koboldt, 1999. "Strategic Power in the European Union," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 339-366, July.
    21. Thomas König & Thomas Bräuninger, 1998. "The Inclusiveness of European Decision Rules," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 125-142, January.
    22. Diego Varela, 2009. "Just a Lobbyist?," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 7-34, March.
    23. Robert Pahre, 2005. "Formal Theory and Case-Study Methods in EU Studies," European Union Politics, , vol. 6(1), pages 113-145, March.

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