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Koalitionsbildungen im Rahmen der Corporate Governance als Anlass für weitere Reformen des unternehmerischen Überwachungssystems

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  • Patrick Velte
  • Stefan Weber

Abstract

Erklärungsansätze für Koalitionsbildungen im Rahmen der Corporate Governance bieten die traditionellen agencytheoretischen Modelle und Quasi-Renten-Ansätze einerseits und die Organisations- und Stewardship-Theorie andererseits. Während sich die beiden erstgenannten Ansätze ausschließlich auf die Möglichkeit einer Koalitionsbildung zwischen Vorstand und Abschlussprüfer – ggf. erweitert um den Aufsichtsrat – zulasten der Hauptversammlung beziehen, lassen sich die Organisations- und Stewardship-Theorie zur Erklärung einer Kooperation zwischen Aufsichtsrat und Abschlussprüfer zugunsten der Hauptversammlung heranziehen. Unter Zugrundelegung dieser Theorieansätze erfolgt im vorliegenden Beitrag eine Wertung der im Zuge des Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetzes (BilMoG) implementierten Maßnahmen zur Regulierung des Verhältnisses zwischen Vorstand, Aufsichtsrat und Abschlussprüfer. Im Ergebnis ist festzuhalten, dass der nationale Gesetzgeber punktuell Maßnahmen zur Senkung des Koalitionsrisikos zwischen Vorstand und Abschlussprüfer und zu einer gleichzeitigen Intensivierung der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Aufsichtsrat und Abschlussprüfer ergriffen hat. Zu nennen sind neben der Konkretisierung des Anforderungsprofils an Aufsichtsräte und Prüfungsausschüsse insbesondere die Betonung der Überwachung der Unabhängigkeit des Abschlussprüfers durch den Aufsichtsrat sowie der erweiterten mündlichen und schriftlichen Berichterstattung des Abschlussprüfers über seine Unabhängigkeit. Es ist jedoch gleichzeitig festzustellen, dass insbesondere aus Sicht der Agency-Theorie weiterer normativer Handlungsbedarf nach dem BilMoG besteht. So hat der Vorstand de facto weiterhin die Möglichkeit, Einfluss auf die Prüfungsqualität zu nehmen. Dies kann etwa durch eine Beeinflussung des Aufsichtsrats bei der Abgabe des Vorschlags zur Wahl des Abschlussprüfers und der Erteilung des Prüfungsauftrags, die Vergabe von Nichtprüfungsaufträgen, die vorherige Stellungnahme zum Prüfungsbericht des Abschlussprüfers sowie durch die Nichtaushändigung des Management Letters an den Aufsichtsrat bewirkt werden. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2010

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Velte & Stefan Weber, 2010. "Koalitionsbildungen im Rahmen der Corporate Governance als Anlass für weitere Reformen des unternehmerischen Überwachungssystems," Metrika: International Journal for Theoretical and Applied Statistics, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 393-417, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:metrik:v:20:y:2010:i:4:p:393-417
    DOI: 10.1007/s00187-010-0097-0
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