Learning by replicator and best-response: the importance of being indifferent
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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-017-0547-z
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More about this item
Keywords
Best-response dynamics; Replicator dynamics; Learning; Basin of attraction;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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