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Mathematical Formalization Of Institutions

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  • A. Yu. Obydenov

Abstract

The article proposes the way of mathematical formalization of institutions in the framework of game-theory approach. The rules are represented by transpositions of payoffs in payment matrix. Such the transitions call the change the structure of game equilibriums. This approach allows separation of coordination and distribution aspects of institutions, division institutions into classes and distinguishing aggregateÑ of institutions, which produce identical transformation. Through evolutionary game theory formalism it is shown that such parametric management influences the structure of steady states, what allows investigation of institutions’ influence on self-organization, in particular, through transformation of topology of phase portrait of the system. In accordance with the fact that dynamic with multiple steady states is typical for coordination problem as a whole, an approach suggested of the rules formalization appears to have rather broad application.

Suggested Citation

  • A. Yu. Obydenov, 2018. "Mathematical Formalization Of Institutions," Strategic decisions and risk management, Real Economy Publishing House, issue 4.
    • Handle: RePEc:abw:journl:y:2018:id:800
    DOI: 10.17747/2078-8886-2018-4-54-57
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Russell Golman & Scott Page, 2010. "Basins of attraction and equilibrium selection under different learning rules," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 73-75, January.
    2. Polterovich, Victor, 2007. "Institutional Trap," MPRA Paper 20595, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ross Cressman, 2003. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033054, April.
    4. Russell Golman & Scott Page, 2010. "Basins of attraction and equilibrium selection under different learning rules," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 49-72, January.
    5. A. Obydenov., 2016. "Foundations of the parametric strategic management: An institutional economics perspective," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 8.
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