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Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels

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  • Sawa, Ryoji
  • Zusai, Dai

Abstract

We consider deterministic evolutionary dynamics under imitative revision protocols. We allow agents to have different aspiration levels in the imitative protocols where their aspiration levels are not observable to other agents. We show that the distribution of strategies becomes statistically independent of the aspiration level eventually in the long run. Thus, long-run properties of homogeneous imitative dynamics hold as well, despite heterogeneity in aspiration levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Sawa, Ryoji & Zusai, Dai, 2014. "Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 562-577.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:154:y:2014:i:c:p:562-577
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dai Zusai, 2018. "Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution," Papers 1805.04897, arXiv.org, revised May 2019.
    2. Dai Zusai, 2017. "Nonaggregable evolutionary dynamics under payoff heterogeneity," DETU Working Papers 1702, Department of Economics, Temple University.
    3. Srinivas Arigapudi & Omer Edhan & Yuval Heller & Ziv Hellman, 2022. "Mentors and Recombinators: Multi-Dimensional Social Learning," Papers 2205.00278, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    4. Dai Zusai, 2018. "Net gains in evolutionary dynamics: A unifying and intuitive approach to dynamic stability," Papers 1805.04898, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    5. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    6. Alfio Giarlotta & Angelo Petralia, 2024. "Simon’s bounded rationality," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 47(1), pages 327-346, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Learning; Imitation; Multiple populations; Aspiration level; Wright manifold;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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